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Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with 
more realistic psychological foundations.  This book consists of representative recent articles in 
behavioral economics.1 This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and 
methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising 
new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chapters’ coverage of topics. 
  
What Behavioral Economics Tries To Do 
At the core of behavioral economics is the conviction that increasing the realism of the 
psychological underpinnings of economic analysis will improve economics on its wn terms -- 
generating theoretical insights, making better predictions of field phenomena, and suggesting 
better policy.  This conviction does not imply a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach 
to economics based on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency. The neoclassical 
approach is useful because it provides economists with a theoretical framework that can be 
applied to almost any form of economic (and even non-economic) behavior, and it makes 
                                                
1Since it is a book of advances, many of the seminal articles which influenced those collected here are not included, 
but are noted below and are widely reprinted elsewhere. 
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refutable predictions.  Many of these predictions are tested in the chapters of this book, and 
rejections of those predictions suggest new theories. 
 Most of the papers modify one or two assumptions in standard theory in the direction of 
greater psychological realism. Often these departures are not radical at all because they relax 
simplifying assumptions that are not central to the economic approach.  For example, there is 
nothing in core neoclassical theory that specifies that people should not care about fairness, that 
they should weight risky outcomes in a linear fashion, or that they must discount the future 
exponentially at a constant rate.2 Other assumptions simply acknowledge human limits on 
computational power, willpower, and self-i ter st. These assumptions can be considered 
'procedurally rational' (Herbert Simon’s term) because they posit functional heuristics for solving 
problems that are often so complex that they cannot be solved exactly by even modern computer 
algorithms.  
 
Evaluating Behavioral Economics 
Stigler (1965) says economic theories should be judged by three criteria: congruence with 
reality, generality, and tractability. Theories in behavioral economics should be judged this way 
too. We share the positivist view that the ultimate test of a theory is the accuracy of its 
predictions.3 But we also believe that, ceteris paribus, better predictions are likely to result from 
theories with more realistic assumptions.  
Theories in behavioral economics also strive for generality – e.g., by adding only one or 
two parameters to standard models. Particular parameter values then often reduce the behavioral 
model to the standard one, and the behavioral model can be pitted against the standard model by 
estimating parameter values. And once parameter values are pinned down, the behavioral model 
can be applied just as widely as the standard one. 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
2While the papers in this book largely adhere to the basic neoclassical framework, there is nothing inherent in 
behavioral economics that requires one to embrace the neoclassical economic model.  Indeed, we consider it likely 
that alternative paradigms will eventually be proposed which have greater explanatory power.  Recent developments 
in psychology, such as connectionist models that capture some of the e sential features of neural functioning, bear 
little resemblance to models based on utility maximization, yet are reaching the point where they are able to predict 
many judgmental and behavioral phenomena. 
3Contrary to the positivistic view, however, we b lieve that predictions of feelings (e.g., of subjective well-b ing) 
should also be an important goal.   
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Adding behavioral assumptions often does make the models less tractable.  However, 
many of the papers represented in this volume show that it can be done.  Moreover, despite the 
fact that they often add parameters to standard models, behavioral models, in some cases, can 
even be more precise than traditional ones which assume more rationality, when there is 
dynamics and strategic interaction.  Thus, Lucas (1986) noted that rational expectations allows 
multiple inflationary and asset price paths in dynamic models, while adaptive expectations pins 
down one path. The same is true in game theory: Models based on cognitive algorithms  (e.g., 
Camerer, Ho & Chong, 2001) often generate pr cise predictions in those games where the mutual 
consistency requirement of Nash permits multiple equilibria.  
The realism, generality and tractability of behavioral economics can be illustrated with 
the example of loss-aversion.  Loss-aversion is the disparity between the strong aversion to losses 
relative to a reference point and the weaker desire for gains of equivalent magnitude.  Loss 
aversion is more realistic than the standard continuous, concave, utility function over wealth, as 
demonstrated by hundreds of experiments.  Loss aversion has proved useful in identifying where 
predictions of standard theories will go wrong: Loss-aversi n can help account for the equity 
premium puzzle in finance and asymmetry in price elasticities.  (We provide more examples 
below.)  Loss aversion can also be parameterized in a general way, as the ratio of the marginal 
disutility of a loss relative to the marginal utility of a gain at the reference point (i.e., the ratio of 
the derivatives at zero); the standard model is the special case in which this "loss-aversion 
coefficient" is one.  As the foregoing suggests, loss-aversi n has proved tractable—although not 
always simple-- in several recent applications (e.g., Barberis, Huang & Santos, 2001).  
   
The Historical Context Of Behavioral Economics 
Most of the ideas in behavioral economics are not new; indeed, they return to the roots of 
neoclassical economics after a century-long detour. When economics first became identified as a 
distinct field of study, psychology did not exist as a discipline. Many economists moonlighted as 
the psychologists of their times.  Adam Smith, who is best known for the concept of the 
"invisible hand" and The Wealth of Nations, wrote a less well-known book The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, which laid out psychological principles of individual behavior that are arguably as 
profound as his economic observations. The book is bursting with insights about human 
psychology, many of which presage current developments in behavioral economics.  For 
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example, Adam Smith commented (1759/1892, 311) that "we suffer more... when we fall from a 
better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better.”  Loss 
aversion!  Jeremy Bentham, whose utility concept formed the foundation of neoclassical 
economics, wrote extensively about the psychological underpinnings of utility, and some of his 
insights into the determinants of utility are only now starting to be appreciated (Loewenstein 
1999).  Francis Edgeworth’s Theory of Mathematical Psychics, which introduced his famous 
"box" diagram showing two-person bargaining outcomes, also included a simple model of social 
utility, in which one person’s utility was affected by another person’s payoff, which is a 
springboard for modern theories (see chapt rs 9 and 10 for two examples).  
 The rejection of academic psychology by economists, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, 
began with the neoclassical revolution, which constructed an account of economic behavior built 
up from assumptions about the nature—th t is, the psychology—of homo-economicus. At the 
turn of the 20th century, economists hoped their discipline could be like a natural science. 
Psychology was just emerging at that time, and was not very scientific. The economists thought it 
provided too unsteady a foundation for economics. Their distaste for the psychology of their 
period, as well as dissatisfaction with the hedonistic assumptions of Benthamite utility, led to a 
movement to expunge the psychology from economics.4   
 Expunging psychology from economics happened slowly.  In the early part of the 20th 
century, the writings of economists such as Irving Fisher and Vilfredo Pareto still included rich 
speculations about how people feel and think about economic choices.  Later John Maynard 
Keynes very much appealed to psychological insights, but by the middle of the century 
discussions of psychology had largely disappeared.   
 Throughout the second half of the century, many criticisms of the positivistic perspective 
took place in both economics and psychology. In economics, researchers like George Katona, 
Harvey Leibenstein, Tibor Scitovsky, and Herbert Simon wrote books and articles suggesting the 
                                                
4The economists of the time had less disagreement with psychology than they realized.  Prominent psychologists of 
the time were united with the economists in rejecting hedonism as the basis of behavior.  William James, for 
example, wrote that "psychologic hedonists obey a curiously narrow teleological superstition, for they assume 
without foundation that behavior always aims at the goal of maximum pleasure and minimum pain; but behavior is 
often impulsive, not goal-oriented," while William McDougall stated in 1908 that "it would be a libel, not altogether 
devoid of truth, to say that classical political economy was a tissue of false conclusions drawnfrom false 
psychological assumptions.” (Both quotes from Lewin (1996).) 
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importance of psychological measures and bounds on rationality.  These commentators attracted 
attention, but did not alter the fundamental direction of economics.
 Many coincident developments led to the emergence of behavioral economics as 
represented in this book.  One development was the rapid acceptance by economists of the 
expected utility and discounted tility models as normative and descriptive models of decision 
making under uncertainty and intertemporal choice, respectively.  Whereas the assumptions and 
implications of generic utility analysis are rather flexible, and hence tricky to refute, the expected 
utility and discounted utility models have numerous precise and testable implications.  As a 
result, they provided some of the first "hard targets" for critics of the standard theory.  Seminal 
papers by Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961) and Markowitz (1952) pointed out anomalous 
implications of expected and subjective expected utility.  Strotz (1955) questioned exponential 
discounting. Later scientists demonstrated similar anomalies using compelling experiments that 
were easy to replicate (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, on expected utility, and Thaler, 1981, and 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992, on discounted utility).  
 As economists began to accept anomalies as counterexamples that could not be 
permanently ignored, developments in psychology identified promising directi ns for new 
theory. Beginning around 1960, cognitive psychology became dominated by the metaphor of the 
brain as an information-processing device replacing the behaviorist conception of the brain as a 
stimulus-response machine.  The information-processing metaphor permitted a fresh study of 
neglected topics like memory, problem solving and decision making.  These new topics were 
more obviously relevant to the neoclassical conception of utility maximization than behaviorism 
had appeared to be.  Psychologists such as Ward Edwards, Duncan Luce, Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman, began to use economic models as a benchmark against which to contrast their 
psychological models.  Perhaps the two most influential contributions were published by Tversky 
and Kahneman.  Their 1974 Science article argued that heuristic short- uts created probability 
judgments which deviated from statistical principles.  Their 1979 paper "Prospect theory: 
decision making under risk" documented violations of expected utility and proposed an 
axiomatic theory, grounded in psychophysical principles, to explain the violations.  The latter 
was published in the technical journal Econometrica and is one of the most widely cited papers 
ever published in that journal. 
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A later milestone was the 1986 conference at the University of Chicago, at which an 
extraordinary range of social scientists presented papers (see Hogarth & Reder, 1987). Ten years 
later, in 1997, a special issue of the Quart rly Journal of Economics was devoted to behavioral 
economics (three of those papers are reprinted in this volume). 
 Early papers established a recipe that many lines of research in behavioral economics 
have followed.  First, identify normative assumptions or models that are ubiquitously used by 
economists, such as Bayesian updating, expected utility and discounted utility.  Second, identify 
anomalies—i.e., demonstrate clear violations of the assumption or model, and painstakingly rule 
out alternative explanations (such as subjects’ confusion or transactions costs). And third, u e the 
anomalies as inspiration to create alternative theories that generalize existing models.  A fourth 
step is to construct economic models of behavior using the behavioral assumptions from the third 
step, derive fresh implications, and test them.  This final step has only been taken more recently 
but is well represented in this volume of advances.  
 
 
The Methods Of Behavioral Economics 
The methods used in behavioral economics are the same as those in other areas of 
economics.  At its inception, behavioral economics relied heavily on evidence generated by 
experiments. More recently, however, behavioral economists have moved beyond 
experimentation and embraced the full range of methods employed by economists.  Most 
prominently, a number of recent contributions to behavioral economics, including several 
included in this book (Chapters 21, 25 and 26, and studies discussed in chapters 7 and 11) rely on 
field data.  Other recent papers utilize methods such as field experiments (Gneezy and Rustichini 
(this volume) computer simulation  (Angeletos et al., 2001), and even brain scans (McCabe et al, 
2001). 
 Experiments played a large role in the initial phase of behavioral economics because 
experimental control is exceptionally helpful for distinguishing behavioral explanations from 
standard ones. For example, players in highly anonymous one-shot take-it-or-leave-it 
"ultimatum" bargaining experiments frequently reject substantial monetary offers, ending the 
game with nothing (see Camerer & Thaler, 1995).  Offers of 20% or less of a sum are rejected 
about half the time, even when the amount being divided is several weeks’ wages or $400 in the 
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US (e.g., Camerer, 2002).  Suppose we observed this phenomenon in the field, in the form of 
failures of legal cases to settle before trial, costly divorce proceedings, and labor strikes.  It would 
be difficult to tell whether rejection of offers was the result of reputation-building in repeated 
games, agency problems (between clients and lawyers), confusion, or an expression of distaste 
for being treated unfairly.  In ultimatum game experiments, the first three of these explanations 
are ruled out because the experiments are played once anonymously, have no agents, and are 
simple enough to rule out confusion.  Thus, the experimental data clearly establish that subjects 
are expressing concern for fairness.  Other experiments have been useful for testing whether 
judgment errors which individuals commonly make in psychology experiments also affect prices 
and quantities in markets.  The lab is especially useful for these studies because individual and 
market-level data can be observed simultaneously (e.g., Camerer, 1987; Ganguly, Kagel & 
Moser, 2000).  
 Although behavioral economists initially relied extensively on experimental data, we see 
behavioral economics as a very different enterprise from experimental economics (see 
Loewenstein, 1999).  As noted, behavioral economists are methodological eclectics.  They define 
themselves, not on the basis of the research methods that they employ, but rather their application 
of psychological insights to economics.  Experimental economists, on the other hand, define 
themselves on the basis of their endorsement and use of experimentation as a research tool.  
Consistent with this orientatio , experimental economists have made a major investment in 
developing novel experimental methods that are suitable for addressing economic issues, and 
have achieving a virtual consensus among themselves on a number of important methodological 
issues.   
 This consensus includes features that we find appealing and worthy of emulation (see 
Hertwig & Ortmann, in press).  For example, experimental economists often make instructions 
and software available for precise replication, and raw data are typically archived or generously 
shared for reanalysis.  Experimental economists also insist on paying performance-based 
incentives, which reduces response noise (but does not typically improve rationality; see Camerer 
& Hogarth, 1999), and also have a virtual prohibition against deceiving subjects.  
 However, experimental economists have also developed rules that many behavioral 
economists are likely to find excessively restrictive.  For example, experimental economists 
rarely collect data like demographics, self-reports, response times, and other cognitive measures 
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which behavioral economists have found useful.  Descriptions of the experimental environment 
are usually abstract rather than evocative of a particular context in the outside world because 
economic theory rarely makes a prediction about how contextual labels would matter, and 
experimenters are concerned about losing control over incentives if choosing strategies with 
certain labels is appealing because of the labels themselves.  Psychological research shows that 
the effect of context on decision making can be powerful (see, e.g., Goldstein & Weber, 1995; 
Loewenstein, 2001) and some recent experimental economics studies have explored context 
effects too (e.g., Cooper, Kagel, Lo & Gu, 1999; Hoffman et al, 1994).  Given that context is 
likely to matter, the question is whether to treat it as a nuisance variable or an interesting 
treatment variable. It is worth debating further whether helping subjects see a connection 
between the experiment and the naturally-occ ring situations the experiments is designed to 
model, by using contextual cues, is helpful or not. 
Economics experiments also typically use "stationary replication"—in which the same 
task is repeated over and over, with fresh endowments in each period.  Data from the last few 
periods of the experiment are typically used to draw conclusions about equilibrium behavior 
outside the lab. While we believe that examining behavior after it has converged is of great 
interest, it is also obvious that many important aspects of economic life are like the first f w 
periods of an experiment rather than the last.  If w  think of marriage, educational decisions, and 
saving for retirement, or the purchase of large durables like houses, sailboats, and cars, which 
happen just a few times in a person’s life, a focus exclusively on “post-convergence” behavior is 
clearly not warranted.5  
All said, the focus on psychological realism and economic applicability of research 
promoted by the behavioral-economics perspective suggests the immense usefulness of both 
empirical research outside the lab and of a broader range of approaches to laboratory research.
  
                                                
5We call the standard approach "Groundhog Day" replication, after the Bill Murray movie in which the hero finds 
himself reliving exactly the same day over and over.  Murray’s characte  is depressed until he realizes that he has the 
ideal opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, in a stationary environment, and uses the opportunity to learn how to 
woo his love interest.  
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Basic Concepts and Research Findings 
 
 The field of Behavioral Decision Research, on which behavioral economics has drawn 
more than any other subfield of psychology, typically classifies research into two categories: 
judgment and choice.  Judgment research deals with the processes people use to estimate 
probabilities.  Choice deals with the processes people use to select among actions, aking account 
of any relevant judgments they may have made.  In this section, we provide a background on 
these two general topics to put the contributions of specific chapters into a broader context. 
 
Probability judgment 
Judging the likelihood of events is central to economic life. Will you lose your job in a 
downturn?  Will you be able to find another house you like as much as the one you must bid for 
right away? Will the Fed raise interest rates? Will an AOL-TimeWarner merger increase profits?  
Will it rain during your vacation to London?  These questions are answered by some process of 
judging likelihood.  
 The standard principles used in economics to model probability judgment in economics 
are concepts of statistical sampling, and Bayes’ rule for updating probabilities in the face of new 
evidence.  Bayes’ rule is unlikely to be correct descriptively because it has several features that 
are cognitively unrealistic.  First, Bayesian updating requires a prior.6 Second, Bayesian updating 
requires a separation between previously-judged probabilities and evaluations of new evidence.  
But many cognitive mechanisms use previous information to filter or interpret what is observed, 
violating this separability.  For example, in perception experiments, subj cts who expect to see 
an object in a familiar place—such as a fire hydrant on a sidewalk—perceive that object more 
accurately than subjects who see the same object in an unexpected place—such as on  
coffeeshop counter.  Third, subjective expected utility assumes separability between probability 
judgments of states and utilities which result from those states.  Wishful thinking and other self-
serving motivations violate this separation (see Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997, and this volume).  
Fourth, the Bayesian updating predicts no effects of the order of arrival of information.  But order 
effects are common in memory due to the strength of recent information in working memory 
                                                
6Because it does not specify where the prior comes from, however, it leaves room for psychological theory on the 
front end of the judgment process. 
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(recency effects), and increased "rehearsal" of older memories (primacy effects). These order 
effects mean that how information is sequenced distorts probability judgment (see Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). 
 Cognitive psychologists have proposed heuristic mechanisms that will lead to judgments 
which sometimes violate either sampling principles or Bayes’ rule (see Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002).  For example, people may judge the probabilities of future events based on how easy those 
events are to imagine or to retrieve from memory.  This "availability heuristic" contributes to 
many specific further biases.  One is "hindsight bias":  Because events which actually occurred 
are easier to imagine than counterfactual events that did not, people often overestimate the 
probability they previously attached to events which later happened.  This bias leads to "second-
guessing" or Monday-morning quarterbacking and may be partly responsible for lawsuits against 
stockbrokers who lost money for their clients.  (The clients think the brokers “should have 
known”) A more general bias is called the "curse of knowledge"—people who know a lot find it 
hard to imagine how little others know. The development psychologist Jean Piaget suggested that 
the difficulty of teaching is caused by this curse.  (Why is it so hard to explain something 
“obvious” like consumer indifferenc  curves or Nash equilibrium to your undergraduate 
students?7)  Anybody who has tried to learn from a computer manual has seen the curse of 
knowledge in action.  
Another heuristic for making probability judgments is called "representativeness": People 
judge conditional probabilities like P(hypothesis|data) or P(example|class) by how well the data 
represents the hypothesis or the example represents the class.  Like most heuristics, 
representativeness is an economical shortcut that delivers reasonable judgments with minimal 
cognitive effort in many cases, but sometimes goofs badly and is undisciplined by normative 
principles.  Prototypical exemplars of a class may be judged to be more likely than they truly are 
(unless the prototype’s extremity is part of the prototype).  For example, in judging whether a 
certain student described in a profile is, say, a psychology major or a computer science major, 
people instinctively dwell on how well the profile matches the psychology or computer science 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
7Here is an example from the business world:  When its software engineers refused to believe that everyday folks 
were having trouble learning to use their opaque, buggy software, Microsoft installed a test room with a one-way 
mirror so that the engineers could see people struggling before their very eyes (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998).  
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major stereotype.  Many studies show how this sort of feature-matching can lead people to 
underweigh the "base rate" – in this example, the overall frequency of the two majors.8  
 Another byproduct of representativeness is the "law of small numbers":  Small samples 
are though to represent the properties of the statistical process that generated them (as if the law 
of large numbers, which guarantees that a large sample of independent draws does represent the 
process, is in a hurry to work). If a baseball player gets hits 30% of his times at bat, but is 0 for 4 
so far in a particular game, then he is "due" for a hit in his next at bat in this game, so that this 
game’s hitting profile will more closely represent his overall ability.  The so-ca led "gambler's 
fallacy", whereby people expect a tail after a coin landed heads three times in a row, is one 
manifestation of the law of small numbers.  The flip side of the same misjudgment (so to speak) 
is surprise at the long streaks which result if the time series is random, which can lead people to 
conclude that the coin must be unfair when it isn't.  Field and experimental studies with 
basketball shooting and betting on games show that people, including bettors, believe that there 
is positive autocorrelation—that players experience the "hot hand"— when there is no empirical 
evidence that such an effect exists (see Camerer, 1989a; Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 1985).
 Many studies explore these heuristics and replicate their "biases" in applied domains 
(such as judgments of accounting auditors, consumers buying products, and students in 
classroom negotiations).  It is important to note that a "heuristic" is both a good thing and a bad 
thing.  A good heuristic provides fast, close to optimal, answers when time or cognitive 
capabilities are limited, but it also violates logical principles and leads to errors in some 
situations.  A lively debate has emerged over whether heuristics should be called irrational if they 
were well-adapted to domains of everyday judgment (“ecologically rational”).  In their early 
work, Kahneman, Tversky, and others viewed cognitive biases as the judgmental kin of speech 
errors ("I cossed the toin"), forgetting, and optical illusions: These are systematic errors which, 
even if rare, are useful for illuminating how cognitive mechanisms work. But these errors do not 
imply the mechanisms fail frequently or are not well-adapted for everyday use.  But as 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982, p. 494) wrote, "Although errors of judgment are but a method by 
                                                
8However, this “base-rate fallacy” is being thoughtfully re-examined (e.g., Koehler, 1996). The fact that base rates 
are more clearly included when subjects are asked what fraction of 100 hypothetical cases fit the profile is an 
important clue about how the heuristic operates and its limits (Gigerenzer, Hell & Blank, 1988; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1983).  
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which some cognitive processes are studied, the method has become a significant part of the 
message." The shift in emphasis from the heuristics to the biases they sometimes create happened 
gradually as research moved to applied areas; the revisionist view that heuristics may be near-
optimal is largely a critique (a reasonable one) of the later applied research. 
 Progress in modeling and applying behavioral models of judgment has lagged behind 
other areas, such as loss aversion and hyperbolic time discounting. A promising recent modeling 
approach is “quasi-Bayesian”—viz., assume that people misspecify a set of hypotheses, or 
encode new evidence incorrectly, but otherwise use Bayes’ rule.  For example, Rabin and Schrag 
(1999) model "confirmation bias" by assuming that people who believe hypothes s A is more 
likely than B will never encode pro-A evidence mistakenly, but will sometimes encode pro-B 
evidence as being supportive of A.9  Rabin (2002) models the "law of small numbers" in a quasi-
Bayesian fashion by assuming that people mistakenly think a process generates draws from a 
hypothetical "urn" without replacement, although draws are actually independent (i.e., made with 
replacement).  He shows some surprising implications of this misjudgment.  For example, 
investors will think there is wide variation in skill of, say, mutual-fund managers, even if there is 
no variation at all.  (A manager who does well several years in a row is a surprise if performance 
is mistakenly thought to be mean-rev rting due to "nonreplacement", so quasi-Bayesians 
conclude that the manager must be reallygood.)  
 Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) adopt such a quasi-Bayesian approach to explain 
why the stock market under-reacts to information in the short-term and overreacts in the long-
term. In their model, earnings follow a random walk but investors believe, mistakenly, that 
earnings have positive momentum in some regimes and regress toward the mean in others.  After 
one or two periods of good earnings, the market can’t be confident that momentum exists and 
hence expects mean-r version; but since earnings are really a random walk, the market is too 
pessimistic and is underreacting to good earnings news. After a long string of good earnings, 
however, the market believes momentum is building. Since it isn’t, the market is too optimistic 
and overreacts.  
                                                
9This encoding asymmetry is related to "feature-positive" effects and perceptual encoding biases well documented in 
research on perception. After buying a Volvo you will suddenly "see" more Volvos on the road, due purely to 
heightened familiarity.  
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 While other approaches that find ways of formalizing some of the findings of cognitive 
psychology are possible, our guess is that the quasi-Bayesian view will quickly become the 
standard way for translating the cognitive psychology of judgment into a tractable alternative to 
Bayes’ rule.  The models mentioned in the two paragraphs above are parameterized in such a way 
that the Bayesian model is embedded as a special case, which allows theoretical insight and 
empirical tests about how well the Bayesian restriction fits. 
 
Preferences: Revealed, constructed, discovered, or learned? 
 Standard preference theory incorporates a number of strong and testable assumptions.  
For example, it assumes that preferences are "referenc independent" – i.e., are not affected by 
the individual’s transient asset position.  It also assumes that preferences are invariant with 
respect to superficial variations in the way that options are described, and that elicited 
preferences do not depend on the precise way that preferences are measured as long as the 
method used is "incentive compatible" – i.e., provides incentives for people to reveal their "true" 
preferences.  All of these assumptions have been violated in significant ways (see Slovic, 1995). 
 For example, numerous "framing effects" show that the way that choices are presented to 
an individual often determine the preferences that are "revealed."  The classic example of a 
framing effect is the "Asian disease" problem in which people are informed about a disease that 
threatens 600 citizens and asked to choose between two undesirable options (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981).  In the "positive frame" people are given a choice between (A) saving 200 
lives for sure, or (B) a 1/3 chance of saving all 600 with a 2/3 chance of saving no one.  In the 
"negative frame" people are offered a choice between (C) 400 people dying for sure, or (D) a 2/3 
chance of 600 dying and a 1/3 chance of no one dying.  Despite the fact that A and C, and B and 
D, are equivalent in terms of lives lost or at risk, most people choose A over B but D over C.   
 Another phenomenon that violates standard theory is called an "anchoring effect."  The 
classic demonstration of an anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, and in this volume) 
was identified in the context of judgment rather than choice.  Subjects were shown the spin of a 
wheel of fortune that could range between 0 and 100 and were asked to guess whether the 
number of African nations in the United Nations was greater thn or less an this number.  They 
were then asked to guess the true value.  Although the wheel of fortune was obviously random, 
subjects’ guesses were strongly influenced by the spin of the wheel.  As Kahneman and Tversky 
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interpreted it, subjects seemed to "anchor" on the number spun on the wheel and then adjusted 
for whatever else they thought or knew, but adjusted insufficiently.  Of interest in this context is 
that anchoring effects have also been demonstrated for choices as opposed to judgments.  In one 
study, subjects were asked whether their certainty equivalent for a gamble was greater than or 
less than a number chosen at random and then were asked to specify their actual certainty 
equivalent for the gamble (Johnson & Schkade, 1989).  Again, the stated values were correlated 
significantly with the random value.   
In a recent study of anchoring, Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (in press) sold valuable 
consumer products (a $100 wireless keyboard, a fancy computer mouse, bottles of wine, and a 
luxurious box of chocolate) to postgraduate (MBA) business students. The students were 
presented with a product and asked whether they would buy it for a price equal to the last two 
digits of their own social security number (a roughly random identification number required to 
obtain work in the United States) converted into a dollar figure– e.g., if the last digits were 79 the 
hypothetical price was $79.  After giving a yes/no response to the question “Would you pay $79?, 
subjects were asked to state the most they would pa (using a procedure that gives people an 
incentive to say what they really would pay).  Although subjects were reminded that the Social 
Security number is essentially random, those with high numbers were willing to pay more for the 
products.  For example, subjects with numbers in the bottom half of the distribution priced a 
bottle of wine--  a 1998 Cotes du Rhone Jaboulet Parallel ‘45’ – at $11.62, while those with 
numbers in the top half priced the same bottle at $19.95.  
 Many studies have also shown that the method used to elicit preferences can have 
dramatic consequences, sometimes producing "preference reversals"-- situation  in which A is 
preferred to B under one method of elicitation, but A is judged as inferior to B under a different 
elicitation method (e.g., Grether & Plott, 1979).  The best known example contrasts how people 
choose between two bets versus what they separately state as their selling prices for the bets.  If 
bet A offers a high probability of a small payoff and bet B offers a small probability of a high 
payoff, the standard finding is that people choose the more conservative A bet over bet B when 
asked to choose, but are willing to pay more for the riskier bet B when asked to price them 
separately.  Another form of preference revrsal occurs between joint and separate evaluations of 
pairs of goods (Hsee et al, 1999; see Hsee & LeClerc, 1998, for an application to marketing).  
People will often price or otherwise evaluate an item A higher than another item B when the two 
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are evaluated independently, but evaluate B more highly than A when the two items are 
compared and priced at the same time. 
 "Context effects" refer to ways in which preferences between options depend on what 
other options are in the set (contrary to "independence of irrelevant alternatives" assumptions). 
For example, people are generally attracted to options that dominate other options (Huber, Payne 
& Puto, 1982).  They are also drawn disproportionately to "compromise" alternatives whose 
attribute values lie between those of other alternatives (Simonson & Tversky, 1992).  
All of the above findings suggest that preferences are not the pre-defined sets of 
indifference curves represented in microeconomics textbooks.  They are often ill-d fined, highly 
malleable and dependent on the context in which they are elicited.  Nevertheless, when required 
to make an economic decisions—t  choose a brand of toothpaste, a car, a job, or how to invest—
people do make some kind of decision.  Behavioral economists refer to the process by which 
people make choices with ill-def ned preferences as "constructing preferences" (Payne, Bettman 
& Johnson, 1992; Slovic, 1995).  
A theme emerging in recent research is that, although people often reveal inconsistent or 
arbitrary preferences, they typically obey normative principles of economic theory when it is 
transparent how to do so.  Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (in press) refer to this pattern as 
"coherent arbitrariness" and illustrate the phenomenon with a series of studies in which the 
amount subjects demanded to listen to an annoying sound is sensitive to an arbitrary anchor, but 
they also demand much more to listen to the tone for a longer period of time.  Thus, while 
expressed valuations for one unit of a good are sensitive to an anchor which is clearly arbitrary, 
subjects also obey the normative principle of adjusting those valuations to the quantity – in this 
case the duration -- of the annoying sound. 
Most evidence that preferences are constructed comes from demonstrations that some 
feature that should not matter actually does.  The way gambles are "framed" as gains and losses 
from a reference outcome, the composition of a choice set, and whether people choose among 
objects or value them separately, have all been shown to make a difference in expressed 
preference.  But admittedly, a list of a theory’s failings is not an alternative theory.  So far, a 
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parsimonious alternative theory has not emerged to deal with all of these challenges to utility 
maximization.10  
 
Overview of the Book 
In what follows, we review different topic areas of behavioral economics to place 
chapters of the book into context.  The book is organized so that early chapters discuss basic 
topics such as decision making under risk and intertemporal choice, while later chapters provid  
applications of these ideas.   
 
Reference-dependence and loss aversion 
In classical consumer theory, preferences among different commodity bundles are 
assumed to be invariant with respect to an individual’s current endowment or consumption.  
Contrary to this simplifying assumption, diverse forms of evidence point to a dependence of 
preferences on one’s reference point (typically the current endowment).  Specifically, people 
seem to dislike losing commodities from their consumption bundle much more than they like 
gaining other commodities.  This can be expressed graphically as a kink in indifference curves at 
the current endowment point (Knetsch, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
 In the simplest study showing reference-d pendence, Knetsch (1992) endow d some 
subjects randomly with a mug, while others received a pen.11  Both groups were allowed to 
switch their good for the other at a minimal transaction cost, by merely handing it to the 
experimenter.  If preferences are independent of random endowments, the fractio s of subjects 
swapping their mug for a pen and the fraction swapping their pen for a mug should add to 
roughly one.  In fact, 22% of subjects traded.  The fact that so few chose to trade implies an 
exaggerated preference for the good in their endowment, or a distaste for losing what they have.  
 A seminal demonstration of an "endowment effect" in buying and selling prices was 
conducted by Kahneman et al (1990).  They endowed half of the subjects in a group with coffee 
mugs. Those who had mugs were asked the lowest price at which they would sell. Those who did 
                                                
10Some specialized models have been proposed to explain particular phenomena, such as Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount 
& Bazerman, 1999; Prelec, Wernerfelt & Zettelmeyer, 1997; Tversky, Slovic & Kahneman, 1990. 
 
11Note that any possible information value from b ing given one good rather than the other is minimized because the 
endowments are random, and subjects knew that half the others received the good they didn’t have. 
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not get mugs were asked how much they would pay.  There should be essentially no difference 
between selling and buying prices.  In fact, the median selling price was $5.79 and the median 
buying price was $2.25, a ratio of more than two: one which has been repeatedly replicated.  
Although calibrationally entirely implausible, some economists were concerned that the results 
could be driven by “wealth effects”—tho e given mugs are wealthier than those not given mugs, 
and this might make them value mugs more and money less.  But in a different study reported in 
the same paper, the selling prices of one group were compared to the "choosing" prices of 
another:  For a series of money amounts, subjec  chose whether they would prefer to have a mug 
or money.  The median choosing price was half the median selling price ($3.50 versus $7.00).  
Choosers are in precisely the same wealth position as sellers—they choose between a mug or 
money.  The only difference is that sellers are "giving up" a mug they "own," whereas choosers 
are merely giving up the right to have a mug.  Any difference between the two groups cannot be 
attributed to wealth effects. 
 Kahneman et al's work was motivated in part by survey evidence from "contingent 
valuation" studies that attempt to establish the dollar value of goods which are not routinely 
traded. Contingent valuation is often used to do government cost-be efit analysis or establish 
legal penalties from environmental damage. These surveys typically show very large differences 
between buying prices (e.g., paying to clean up oily beaches) and selling prices (e.g., having to be 
paid to allow beaches to be ruined).  Sayman and Öncüler (1997) summarize 73 data sets which 
show selling-to-buying ratios ranging from .67 (for raspberry juice) to 20 or higher (for density of 
trees in a park and health risks). 
 Loss aversion has already proved to be a useful phenomenon for making sense of field 
data (see Camerer, 2000, and this volume).  Asy metries in demand elasticities after price 
increases and decreases (Hardie, Johnson, & Fader, 1993), the tendency for New York City cab 
drivers to quit early after reaching a daily income target (producing surprising upward-sloping 
labor supply curves; see Camerer et al, 1997 and in this volume), and the large gap between stock 
and bond returns (the "equity premium"; see Benartzi & Thaler, 1995, in this volume) can all be 
explained by models in which agents have reference-dep ndent preferences and take a short 
planning horizon, so that losses are not integrated against past or future gains. 
 A particularly conclusive field study by Genoseve and Mayer (2001, and this volume) 
focuses on the real estate market.  (Housing is a huge market—worth $10 rillion at the time of 
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their study, a quarter of the wealth in the US—and full of interesting opportunities to do 
behavioral economics.)  They find that list prices for condominiums in Boston are strongly 
affected by the price at which the condominium was purchased.  Motivated sellers should, of 
course, regard the price they paid as a sunk cost and choose a list price that anticipates what the 
market will pay.  But people hate selling their houses at a nominal loss from the purchase price. 
Sellers’ listing prices and subsequent selling behavior reflects this aversion to nominal losses. 
Odean (1998) finds the same effect of previous purchase price in stock sales.12
 At least three features of endowment effects remain open to empirical discussion.  First, 
do people anticipate the endowment effect? The answer seems to be "No":  Loewenstein and 
Adler (1995) found that subjects did not anticipate how much their selling prices would increase 
after they were endowed with mugs.13  Van Boven, Dunning and Loewenstein (2000) and Van 
Boven, Loewensstein and Dunning (2000) found that agents for buyers also underestimated how 
much sellers would demand.  
 Second, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990:1328) note that "there are some cases in 
which no endowment effect would be expected, such as when goods are purchased for resale 
rather than for utilization."   However, the boundary of commercial non-attachme t has not been 
carefully mapped.  Do art or antique dealers "fall in love" with pieces they buy to resell?  What 
about surrogate mothers who agree to bear a child for a price paid in advance?  Evidence on the 
degree of commercial attachment is mixed.  In their housing study, Genesove and Mayer (2001 
and this volume) note that investors who don’t live in their condos exhibit less loss-aversion than 
owners.  A field experiment by List (in press) found that amateur sports paraphernalia collectors 
who do not trade very often showed an endowment effect, but professional dealers and amateurs 
who trade a lot did not.14  An example where attachment seemed important even among 
                                                
12Though it is harder to unambiguously interpret as loss aversion in the sense we arediscussing h re, reference points 
can also serve as social focal points for judging performance.  Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser (1999) document an 
interesting example from corporate finance. Managers whose firms face possible losses (or declines from a previous 
year’s earnings) are very reluctant to report small losses.  As a result, the distribution of actual losses and gains 
shows a very large spike at zero, and hardly any small reported losses (compared to the number of small gains).  
Wall Street hates to see a small loss. A manager who does not have the skill to shift accounting profits to erase a 
potential loss (i.e., "has some earnings in his pocket") is considered a poor manager.  In this example, the market’s 
aversion to reported losses can serve as a sign ling device which tells the markets about managerial ability. 
13Failure to anticipate the strength of later loss-av si n is one kind of "projection bias" (Loewenstein, O'Donoghue 
& Rabin, 1999), in which agents are make choices as if their current preferences or emotions will last longer than 
they actually do. 
14By revisiting the same traders a year later, List showed that it was trader experience which reduced endowment 
effects, rather than self-selection (i.e., people who are immune to such effects becom  dealers.) 
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experienced traders with high incentives was described by an investment banker who said his 
firm combats loss-aversion by forcing a trader to periodically switch his "position" (the portfolio 
of assets the trader bought and is blamed or credited for) with the position of another trader.  
Switching ensures that traders do not make bad trades because of loss-aversion and emotional 
attachment to their past actions (while keeping the firm’s net position unchanged, since the 
firm’s total position is unchanged).  
 Third, it is not clear the degree to which endowment effects are based solely on the 
current endowment, rather than past endowments or other reference points.  Other reference 
points, such as social comparison  ( .e., the possessions and attainments of other people) and past 
ownership, may be used to evaluate outcomes.  How multiple reference points are integrated is 
an open question.  Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) found that the valuation of objects 
depended not only on whether an individual was currently endowed with an object, but on the 
entire past history of ownership – how long the object had been owned or, if it had been lost in 
the past, how long ago it was lost and how long it was owned before it was lost.  These "history-
of-ownership effects" were sufficiently strong that choice prices of people who had owned for a 
long period but just lost an object were higher than the selling prices of people who had just 
acquired the same object.   
If people are sensitive to gains and losses from reference points, the way in which they 
combine different outcomes can make a big difference.  For example, a gain of $150 and a loss of 
$100 will seem unattractive if they are evaluated separately, if the utility of gains is sufficiently 
less than the disutility of equal-sized losses, but the gain of $50 that results when the two figures 
are added up is obviously attractive.  Thaler (1980, 1999 and this volume) suggests that a useful 
metaphor for describing the rules which govern gain/loss integration is “mental accounting”—
people set up mental accounts for outcomes which are psychologically separate, much as 
financial accountants lump expenses and revenues into separated accounts to guide managerial 
attention.  Mental accounting stands in opposition to the standard view in economics that "money 
is fungible"; it predicts, accurately, that people will spend money coming from different sources 
in different ways (O'Curry, 1999), and has wide-r nging implications for such policy issues as 
how to promote saving (see, e.g., Thaler, 1994). 
A generalization of the notion of mental accounting is the concept of "choice bracketing," 
which refers to the fashion in which people make decisions narrowly, in either a piece-meal 
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fashion, or broadly – i.e., taking account of interdependencies between decisions (Read, 
Loewenstein & Rabin, 1999).  How people bracket choices has far-reaching consequences in 
diverse areas, including finance (see Bernartzi & Thaler, 1995 and chapter 22), labor su ply 
(Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein & Thaler, 1997, and chapter 19), and intertemporal choice 
(Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, in press and chapter 6, section 5.3.4).  For example, 
when making many separate choices between goods, people tend to choos more diversity when 
the choices are bracketed broadly than when they are bracketed narrowly.  This was first 
demonstrated by Simonson (1990), who gave students their choice of one of six snacks during 
each of three successive weekly class meetings.  Some students chose all three snacks in the first 
week, although they didn't receive their chosen snack until the appointed time, and others chose 
each snack on the day that they were to receive it (narrow bracketing; sequential choice).  Under 
broad bracketing, fully 64% chose a different snack for each week, as opposed to only 9% under 
narrow bracketing.  Follow-up studies demonstrated similar phenomena in the field (e.g., in 
purchases of yogurt; Simonson & Winer, 1992).   
Bracketing also has implications for ri k-taking. When people face repeated risk 
decisions, evaluating those decisions in combination can make them appear less risky than if they 
are evaluated one at a time.  Consequently, a decision maker who refuses a single gamble may 
nonetheless accept two or more identical ones.  By assuming that people care only about their 
overall level of wealth, expected utility theory implicitly assumes broad bracketing of risky 
decisions.  However, Rabin (2000) points out the absurd implication which follows from this 
assumption (combined with the assumption that risk aversion stems from the curvature of the 
utility function):  A reasonable amount of aversion toward risk in small gambles implies a 
dramatic aversion to reduction in overall wealth.  For example, a p rson who will turn down a 
coin flip to win $11 and lose $10 at all wealth levels must also turn down a coin flip in which she 
can lose $100, no matter how large the possible gain is.15  Rabin’s proof is a mathematical 
                                                
15The intuition behind Rabin’s striking result is this: In expected-utility theory, rejecting a (+$11,-$10) coin flip at 
wealth level W implies that the utility increase from the $11 gain is smaller than the total utility decrease from the 
$10 loss, meaning that the marginal utility of each dollar gained is at most 10/11 of the marginal utility of each dollar 
lost.  By concavity, this means that the marginal utility of the W+11th dollar is at most 10/11 the marginal utility of 
the W-10th dolar—a sharp 10% drop in marginal utility for small change in overall wealth of $21.  When the 
curvature of the utility function does not change unrealistically over ranges of wealth levels, this means the marginal 
utility plummets quickly as wealth increases—the marginal utility of the W+$32 dollar (= W+11 + 21) can be at 
most (10/11)(10/11), which is around 5/6 of the marginal utility of the W-10th d llar.  Every $21 decrease in wealth 
yields another 10% decline in marginal utility. This implies, mathematically, at implying a person’s value for a 
dollar if he were $500 or $1,000 wealthier would be tiny compared to how much he values dollars he might lose in a 
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demonstration that people who are averse to small risks are probably not integrating all their 
wealth into one source when they think about small gambles.  
 
Preferences over risky and uncertain outcomes 
 The expected-utility EU hypothesis posits that the utility of a risky distribution of 
outcomes (say, monetary payoffs) is a probability-weighted average of the outcome utilities.  
This hypothesis is normatively appealing because it follows logically from apparently reasonable 
axioms, most notably the independence (or “cancellation”) axiom.  The independence axiom says 
that if you are comparing two gambles, you should cancel events which lead to the same 
consequence with the same probability; your choice should be independent of those equally-
likely common consequences.  Expected utility also simplifies matters because a person’s taste 
for risky money distributions can be fully captured by the shape of the utility function for money.  
Many studies document predictive failures of expected utility in simple situations in 
which subjects can earn substantial sums of money from their choices.16 Starmer’s (2000) 
contribution to this volume reviews most of these studies, as well as the many theories that have 
been proposed to account for the evidence (see also Camerer, 1989b, 1992; Hey, 1997; Quiggin, 
1993).  Some of these new theories alter the way in which probabilities are weighted, but 
preserve a "betweenness" property which says that if A is preferred to B, then any probabilistic 
gamble between them must be preferred to B but dispreferred to A (i.e., the gambles lie 
“between” A and B in preference).  Other new theories suggest that probability weights are 
"rank-dependent"—outcomes are first ranked, then their probabilities are weighted in a way 
which is sensitive to how they rank within the gamble that is being considered.  One 
mathematical way to do this is transform the cumulative probabilities of outcomes (i.e., the 
chance that you will win X or less) nonlinearly and weight outcome utilities by the differences of 
                                                                                                                                                            
bet.  So if a person’s attitude towards gambles really came from the utility-of-wealth function, even incredibly large 
gains in wealth would not tempt her to risk $50 or $100 losses, if she really dislikes losing $10 more than she likes 
gaining $11 at every level of wealth.  
 
16Some of the earlier studies were done with hypothetical payoffs, leading to specul tion that the rejection of EU 
would not persist with real stakes.  Dozens of recent studies show that, in fact, paying real money instead of making 
outcomes hypothetical appears either fails to eliminate EU rejections, or strengthens the rejections of EU (because 
sharper results which come from greater incentive imply that rejections are more statistically significant; Harless & 
Camerer, 1994). 
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those weighted cumulative probabilities.17  The best known theory of this sort is cumulative 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
There are three clear conclusions from the experimental research (Harless & Camerer, 
1994). One is that of the two new classes of theories that allow more general functional forms 
than expected utility, the new rank-dependent theories fit the data better than the new  
betweenness class theories.  A second conclusion is that the statistical evidence against EU is so 
overwhelming that it is pointless to run more studies testing EU against alternative theories (as 
opposed to comparing theories with one-another).  The third conclusion is that EU fits worst 
when the two gambles being compared have different sets of possible outcomes (or "support").  
Technically, this property occurs when one gamble has a unique outcome.  The fact that EU does 
most poorly for these comparisons implies that nonlinear  weighting of low probabilities is 
probably a major source of EU violations.  Put differently, EU is like Newtonian mechanics, 
which is useful for objects traveling at low velocities but mispredicts at high speeds.  Linear 
probability weighting in EU works reasonably well except when outcome probabilities are very 
low or high. But low-probability events are important in the economy, in the form of “gambles” 
with positive skewness (lottery tickets, and also risky business ventures in biotech and 
pharmaceuticals), and catastrophic events which require large insurance industries.   
 Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) explains xperimental choices more 
accurately than EU because it gets the psychophysics of judgment and choice right.  It consists of 
two main components: a probability weighting function, and a 'value function' which replaces the 
utility function of EU.  The weighting function p(p) combines two elements: (1) The level of 
probability weight is a way of expressing risk tastes (if you hate to gamble, you place low weight 
on any chance of winning anything); and (2) the curvature in p(p) captures how sensitive people 
are to differences in probabilities. If people are more sensitive in the neighborhoods of possibility 
and certainty—i.e., changes in probability near zero and 1— than to intermediate gradations, then 
their p(p) curve will overweight low probabilities and underweight high ones.  
                                                
17A technical motivation for “rank dependent” theories-- ranking outcomes, then weighting their probabilities-- is 
that when separate probabilities are weighted, it is easy to construct examples in which people will violate 
dominance by choosing a “dominated” gamble A which has a lower chance of winning at each possible outcome 
amount, compared to the higher chance of winning the same outcome amount for a dominant gamble B. If people 
rarely choose such dominated gambles, they are acting as if they are weighting the differ nces in cumulated 
probabilities, which is the essence of the rank-dependent approaches.  
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 The value function reflects the insight, first articulated by Markowitz (1952), that the 
utility of an outcome depends not on the absolute level of wealth that results but on whether the 
outcome is a gain or a loss.  Prospect theory also assumes reflection of risk-preferences at the 
reference point: People are typically averse to risky spreading of possible money gains, but will 
take gambles where they could lose big or break even rather than accept a sure loss. Prospect 
theory also assumes "loss-aversion":  The disutility of a loss of x is worse than the utility of an 
equal-sized gain of x.   
 Expected utility is restricted to gambles with known outcome probabilities.  The more 
typical situation in the world is "uncertainty", or u known (subjective, or personal) probability.  
Savage (1954) proposed a subjective expected utility (SEU) theory in which choices over 
gambles would reveal subjective probabilities of states, as well as utilities for outcomes.  
Ellsberg (1961) quickly pointed out that in Savage’s framework, subjective probabilities are 
slaves to two masters-- they are used as decision weights applied to utilities, and they are 
expressions of likelihood.  As a result, there is no way to express the possibility that, because a 
situation may have lots of "ambiguity," one is reluctant to put much decision weight on any 
outcome. Ellsberg demonstrated this problem in his famous paradox: Many people prefer to bet 
on black drawn from an urn with 50 black and 50 red balls, rather th n bet on black drawn from 
an urn with 100 balls of unknown black and red composition, and similarly for red (they just 
don’t want to bet on the unknown urn).  There is no way for the two sets of red and black 
subjective probabilities from each urn to both add t  one (as subjective probabilities require), and 
still express the distaste for betting neither color in the face of ambiguity.  
 Many theories have been proposed to generalize SEU to allow for ambiguity-aversion 
(see Camerer & Weber, 1992, for a review).  One approach, first proposed by Ellsberg, is to let 
probabilities be s ts rather than specific numbers, and assume that choices over gambles reveal 
whether people pessimistically believe the worst probabilities are the right ones, or the opposite. 
Another approach is to assume that decision weights are nonadditive.  For example, the weights 
on red and black in the Ellsberg unknown urn could both be .4; the missing weight of .2 is a kind 
of "reserved belief" which expresses how much the person dislikes betting when she knows that 
important information is missing.   
Compared to non-EU theories, relatively little empirical work and applications have been 
done with these uncertainty-aversion theories so far. Uncertainty-aversion might explain 
 24
phenomena like voting "rolloff" (when a voter, once in the voting booth, refuses to vote on 
obscure elections in which their vote is most likely to prove pivotal; Ghirardato & Katz, 2000), 
incomplete contracts (Mukherji, 1998) and "home country bias" in investing: People in every 
country overinvest in the country they are most familiar with-- the r o n.  (Finnish people invest 
in firms closer to their own town, see Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001.)  
In asset pricing, ambiguity-aversion can imply that asset prices satisfy a p ir of Euler 
inequalities, rather than an Euler equation, which permits asset prices to be more volatile than in 
standard theory (Epstein & Wang, 1994). Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999) have applied 
related concepts of "robust control" to macroeconomic fluctuations.  Finally, uncertainty-averse 
agents will value information even if it does not change the decisions they are likely to make 
after becoming better-informed (simply because information can make nonadditive decision 
weights closer to additive, and make agents “feel better” about their decision).  This effect may 
explain demand for information in settings like medicine or personal finance, where new 
information usually does not change choices, but relieves anxiety people have from knowing 
there is something they could know but do not (Asch, Patton and Hershey, 1990).  
 
Intertemporal choice 
The discounted-utility (DU) model assumes that people have instantaneous utilities from 
their experiences each moment, and that they choose options which maximize t e present 
discounted sum of these instantaneous utilities.  Typically it is assumed that the instantaneous 
utility each period depends solely on consumption in that period, and that the utilities from 
streams of consumption are discounted exponentially, apply ng the same discount rate in each 
period.  Samuelson (1937) proposed this particular functional form because it was simple and 
similar to present value calculations applicable to financial flows. But in the article in which he 
proposed the DU model, he repeatedly drew attention to its psychological implausibility.18  
Decades of empirical research substantiated his doubts (see Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992, and 
Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, in press and in this volume). 
                                                
18 The notion of discounting utility at a fixed rate was first mentioned, in passing, in an article on 
intergenerational saving by Ramsey (1928). 
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It is useful to separate studies dealing with intertemporal choice into those that focus on 
phenomena that can be explained on the basis of the discount function and those that can be 
explained on the basis of the utility function.  The following two subsections cover these points.   
 
Time Discounting  
A central issue in economics is how agents trade off costs and benefits that occur at 
different points in time. The standard assumption is that people weight future utilities by an 
exponentially-declining discount factor d(t) = t, where 1>d > 0. Note that the discount factor d is 
often expressed as 1/(1+r), where r is a discount rate.  
However, a simple hyperbolic time discounting function of d(t) = 1/(1+kt) tends to fit 
experimental data better than exponential discounting.  The early evidenc  on discounting came 
from studies showing that animals exhibit much large discounting when comparing immediate 
rewards and rewards delayed t periods, compared to the tradeoff between rewards k and k+t 
periods in the future.  Thaler (1981) was the first to empirically test the constancy of discounting 
with human subjects.  He told subjects to imagine that they had won some money in a lottery 
held by their bank.  They could take the money now or earn interest and wait until later.  They 
were asked how much they would require to make waiting just as attractive as getting the money 
immediately.  Thaler then estimated implicit (per- er od) discount rates for different money 
amounts and time delays under the assumption that subjects had linear utilityfunct ons. Discount 
rates declined linearly with the duration of the time delay.  Later studies replicated the basic 
finding that discount rates fall with duration (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989; Holcomb & 
Nelson, 1992). The most striking effect is an "immediacy effect" (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991); 
discounting is dramatic when one delays consumption that would otherwise be immediate. 
 Declining discount rates have also been observed in experimental studies involving real 
money outcomes.  Horowitz tes ed the constancy of discounting by auctioning "bonds" in a 
Vickrey (highest-rejected-bid) auction.  The amount bid for a bond represented how much a 
subject was willing to give up at the time of the auction for certain future payoffs.  Discount rates 
again decreased as the horizon grew longer.  Pender (1996) conducted a study in which Indian 
farmers made several choices between amounts of rice that would be delivered either sooner or 
later.  Fixing the earlier rice ration and varying the amount of rice delivered later gives an 
estimate of the discount rate. To avoid immediacy effects, none of the choices were delivered 
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immediately.  Per-period discount rates decline with the increasing horizon: the mean estimated 
discount rate was .46 for 7 months and .33 for 5 years. 
Hyperbolic time discounting implies that people will make relatively far-sigh ed decisions 
when planning in advance – when all costs and benefits will occur in the future – but will make 
relatively short-sighted decisions when some costs or benefits are immediate.  The systematic 
changes in decisions produced by hyperbolic time discounting create a time-in onsistency in 
intertemporal choice not present in the exponential model.  An agent who discounts utilities 
exponentially would, if faced with the same choice and the same information, make the same 
decision prospectively as he would when the time for a decision actually arrives. In contrast, 
somebody with time-inconsistent hyperbolic discounting will wish prospectively that in the 
future he will take far-sighted actions; but when the future arrives he will behave against his 
earlier wishes, pursuing immediate gratification rather than long-run well-bei . 
 Strotz (1955) first recognized the planning problem for economic agents who would like 
to behave in an intertemporally consistent fashion, and discussed the important ramifications of 
hyperbolic time discounting for intertemporal choice.  Most big decisions – e.g., savings, 
educational investments, labor supply, health and diet, crime and drug use-- h ve costs and 
benefits which occur at different points in time.  Many authors such as Thaler (1981), Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981), and Schelling (1978) discussed the issues of self control and stressed their 
importance for economics. Laibson (1997) accelerated the incorporation of these issues into 
economics by adopting a "quasi-hyperbolic" time discounting function (first proposed by Phelps 
and Pollak (1968) to model intergenerational utility).  The quasi-hyperbolic form approximates 
the hyperbolic function with two-parameters, b and d, in which the weight on current utility is 1 
and the weight on period-t instantaneous utility is bdt for t>0.  The parameter b measures the 
immediacy effect — if b = 1 the model reduces to standard exponential discounting.  When 
delayed rewards are being compared, the immediacy premium b divides out so the ratio of 
discounted utilities is solely determined by dt (consistent with the observations of Benzion, 
Rapoport & Yagil, 1989) 
Thus, quasi-hyperbolic time discounting is basically standard exponential time 
discounting plus an immediacy effect; a person discounts delays in gratification equally at all 
moments except the current one—caring differently about well-being now versus later.  This 
functional form provides one imple and powerful model of the taste for immediate gratification. 
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In his paper reprinted in this volume, Laibson (1997 and chapter 15) applies the quasi-
hyperbolic model to a model of lifetime consumption- avings decisions.  He emphasizes the role 
that the partial illiquidity of an asset plays in helping consumers constrain their own future 
consumption.  If people can withdraw money immediately from their assets, as they can with 
simple savings or checking accounts, they have no way to keep their temptation to over-consume 
under control.  Assets that are less liquid, despite their costly lack of flexibility or even lower 
yield, may be used as a commitment device for those consumers who at least partially understand 
their tendency to over-consume.  In this paper (and in more recent papers by Laibson, Repetto 
and Tobacman (1998)) and others it has been demonstrated how quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
potentially provides a better account than does conventional exponential discounting of various 
savings and consumption phenomena, such as different marginal propensities to consume out of 
different forms of savings, and the ways that financial innovation (typically in the form of 
increased liquidity) may lead to damaging decreases in savings. 
An important question in modelling self-control is whether agents are aware of their self-
control problem (“sophisticated”) or not (“naï ve”).  The work in macroeconomics described 
above assumes agents are sophisticated, but have some commitment technologies to limit how 
much the current self can keep the future self from overspending.19 However, there are certainly 
many times in which people are partially unaware of their own future misbehavior, and hence 
overly optimistic that they will behave in the future the way that their “current self” would like 
them to.  O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999 and this volume; cf. Akerlof, 1991) show how awareness 
of self-control problems can powerfully moderate the behavioral consequences of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting.   
Naivete typically makes damage from poor self-control worse.  For example, severe 
procrastination is a creation of over- ptimism: One can put off doing a task repeatedly if the 
perceived costs of delay are small—"I’ll do it tomorrow, so there is little loss from not doing it 
today"—and hence accumulate huge delay costs from postponing the task many times.  A 
sophisticated agent aware of his procrastination will realize that if they put if off they will put if 
off in the future, and hence will do the task immediately.  However, in some cas s being 
sophisticated about one’s self-control problem can exacerbate yielding to temptation. If you are 
                                                
19Ariely and Wertenbroch (in press) report similar self-commitment—deadline-setting—in an experiment. 
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aware of your tendency to yield to a temptation in the future, you may conclude that you might as 
well yield now; if you naively think you will resist temptation for longer in the future, that may 
motivate you to think it is worthwhile resisting temptation now.  More recently, O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2001) have developed a model of  "partial naivete" that permits a whole continuum of 
degree of awareness, and many other papers on quasi-hyperbolic discounting have begun to 
clarify which results come from the quasi-hyperbolic preferences per se and which come from 
assumptions about self-awareness of those preferences.   
Many of the most striking ways in which the classical DU model appears to fail stem not 
from time discounting, but from characteristics of the utility function.  Numerous survey studies 
(Benzion et al. 1989; Loewenstein, 1988; Thaler 1981) have shown that gains and losses of 
different absolute magnitudes are discounted differently.  Thaler’s (1981) subjects were 
indifferent between $15 immediately and $60 in a year (a ratio of .25) and between $250 
immediately and $350 in a year (a ratio of .71).  Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) replicated these 
"magnitude effects," and also show that estimated discount rates for losses tend to be lower than 
those for gains. Again, these effects are inconsistent with DU.  A third anomaly is that  people 
dislike "temporal losses" – delays in consumption -- much more than they like speeding up 
consumption (Loewenstein, 1988).  
None of these effects can be explained by DU, but they are consistent with a model 
proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).  This model departs from DU in two major ways.  
First, as discussed in the previous subsection, it incorporates a hyperbolic discount function.  
Second, it incorporates a utility function with special curvature properties that is defined over 
gains and losses rather than final levels of consumption.  Most analyses of in ertemporal choice 
assume that people integrate new consumption with planned consumption. While such 
integration is normatively appealing, it is computationally infeasible and, perhaps for this reason, 
descriptively inaccurate.  When people make decisions about new sequences of payments or 
consumption, they tend to evaluate them in isolation – e.g., treating negative outcomes as losses, 
rather than as reductions to their existing money flows or consumption plans.  No model that 
assumes integration can explain the anomalies just discussed. 
 The anomalies just discussed are sometimes mislabeled as discounting effects. It is said 
that people "discount" small outcomes more than large, gains more than losses, and that they 
exhibit greater time discounting for delay than for speed-up. Such statements are misleading.  In 
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fact, all of these effects are consistent with stable, uniform, time discounting once one measures 
discount rates with a more realistic utility function.  The inconsistencies arise from 
misspecification of the utility function, not from differential time discounting of different types 
of outcomes.  
A second anomaly is apparent nega ive time discounting.  If people like savoring pleasant 
future activities they may postpone them to prolong the pleasure (and they may get painful 
activities over with quickly to avoid dread).  For example, Loewenstein (1987) elicited money 
valuations of several outcomes which included a "kiss from the movie star of your choice," and 
"a nonlethal 110 volt electric shock" occurring at different points in time.  The average subject 
paid the most to delay the kiss three days, and was eager to get the shock over with as quickly as 
possible (see also Carson and Horowitz, 1990; MacKeigan et al, 1993).  In a standard DU model, 
these patterns can only be explained by discount factors which are greater than one (or discount 
rates which are negative).  However, Loewenstein (1987) showed that these effects can be 
explained by a model with positive time discounting, in which people derive utility (both positive 
and negative) from anticipation of future consumption.  
 A closely related set of anomalies involves sequences of outcomes.  Until recently, most 
experimental research on intertemporal choice involved single outcomes received at a single 
point in time.  The focus was on measuring the correct form of the discount function and it was 
assumed that once this was determined the value of a sequence of outcomes could be determined 
by simply adding up the present values of its component parts.  The sign and magnitude effects 
and the delay/speed-up asymmetry focused attention on the form of the utility function that 
applies to intertemporal choice, but retained the assumption of additivity across periods.  Because 
they only involved single outcomes, these phenomena shed no light on the validity of the various 
assumptions that involve multiple time periods, and specifically about the different independence 
assumptions.   
Research conducted during the past decade, however, has begun to examine preferences 
toward sequences of outcomes and has found quite consistently that preferences for sequences do 
not follow in a simple fashion from preferences for their component parts (Loewenstein & 
Prelec, 1993). People care about the “gestalt” or overall pattern of a sequence, in a way that 
violates independence.  
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 A number of recent studies have shown that people generally favor sequences that 
improve over time.  Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) and Frank and Hutchens (1993 and this 
volume), for example, found that a majority of subjects prefer an increasing wage profile to a 
declining or flat one, for an otherwise identical job.  Preference for improvement appears to be 
driven in part by savoring and dread (Loewenstein, 1987), and in part by adaptation andloss 
aversion.  Savoring and dread contribute to preference for improvement because, for gains, 
improving sequences allow decision makers to savor the best outcome until the end of the 
sequence.  With losses, getting undesirable outcomes over with quickly eliminates dread.  
Adaptation leads to a preference for improving sequences because people tend to adapt to 
ongoing stimuli over time, and to evaluate new stimuli relative to their adaptation level (Helson, 
1964), which means that people are sensitive to chang.  Adaptation favors increasing sequences, 
which provide a series of positive changes – i.e., ains, over decreasing sequences, which 
provide a series of negative changes – i.e., lo ses.  Loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
intensifies the prefer nce for improvement over deterioration.  
 The idea that adaptation and loss aversion contribute to the preference for sequences, over 
and above the effects of savoring and dread, was suggested by a study conducted by Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1993).  They asked subjects to first state a preference between a fancy French 
restaurant dinner for two either on Saturday in one month or Saturday in two months.  Eighty 
percent preferred the more immediate dinner.  Later the same respondents were asked whether 
they would prefer the sequence fancy French this month, mediocre Greek next month or 
mediocre Greek this month and fancy French next month.  When the choice was expressed as 
one between sequences, a majority of respondents shifted in favor of preferring the improving 
sequence – which delayed the French dinner for two months.  The same pattern was observed 
when the mediocre Greek restaurant was replaced by "eat at home," making it even more 
transparent that the sequence frame was truly changing people’s preferences.  The conclusion of 
this research is that, as in visual perception, people have a "gestalt" notion of an ideal distribution 
of outcomes in time, which includes interactions across time periods that violate simple 
separability axioms.  
 
Fairness and social preferences  
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 The assumption that people maximize their own wealth and other personal material goals 
(hereafter, just "self-interest") is a widely correct simplification that is often useful in economics.  
However, people may sometimes choose to "spend" their wealth to punish others who have 
harmed them, reward those who have helped, or to make outcomes fairer.  Just as understanding 
demand for goods requires specific utility functions, the key to understanding this sort of social 
preferences is a parsimon ous specification of  "social utility" which can explain many types of 
data with a single function.  
 An experimental game which has proved to be a useful workhorse for identifying 
departures from self interest is the "ultimatum" game, first studied by Gü h et al. (1982).  In an 
ultimatum game, a Proposer has an amount of money, typically about $10, from which he must 
propose a division between himself and a Responder.  (The players are anonymous and will 
never see each other again.)  If the Responder accepts the offered split, they both get paid and the 
game ends. If she rejects the offer they get nothing and the game ends.  In studies in more than 20 
countries, the vast majority of Proposers offer between a third and a half of the total, and 
Responders eject offers of less than a fifth of the total about half the time.  A responder who 
rejects an offer is spending money to punish somebody who has behaved unfairly.  
A "trust" game can be used to explore the opposite pattern, "positive reciprocity."  
Positive reciprocity means that players are disposed to reward those who have helped them, even 
at a cost to themselves. In a typical trust game, one player has a pot of money, again typically 
around $10, from which he can choose to keep some amount for himself, and to invest the 
remaining amount X, between $0 and $10, and their investment is tripled.  A trustee then takes 
the amount 3X, keeps as much as she wants, and returns Y.  In standard theory terms, the 
investor-trustee contract is incomplete and the inves or should fear trustee moral hazard. Self-
interested trustees will keep everything (Y = 0) and self-interested investors who anticipate this 
will invest nothing (X = 0).  In fact, in most experiments investors invest about half and trustees 
pay back a litt e less than the investment.  Y varies positively with X, as if trustees feel an 
obligation to repay trust. 
The first attempt to model these sorts of patterns was Rabin (1993, and this volume).  
Fixing Player A’s likely choice, Player B’s choice determines A’s payoff. From A’s point of 
view, B’s choice can be either kind (gives A a lot) or mean (gives A very little).  This enables A 
to form a numerical judgment about B’s kindness, which is either negative or positive (zero 
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represents kindness-neutrality).  Similarly, A’s action is either kind or mean toward B.  In 
Rabin’s approach, people earn a utility from the payoff in the game and a utility from the product 
of their kindness and the kindness of the other player. Multiplying the two kindness terms 
generates both negative and positive reciprocity, or a desire for emotional coordination: If B is 
positively kind, A prefers to be kind too; but if B is mean (negative kindness), then A prefers to 
be mean.  Rabin then uses concepts from game-theory to derived consequences for equilibrium, 
assuming people have fairness-adju ted utilities.20 
 Besides explaining some classic findings, Rabin’s kindness-product approach makes 
fresh predictions:  For example, in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD), mutual cooperation can be a 
"fairness equilibrium."  (Cooperating is nice; therefore, reciprocating anticipated cooperation is 
mutually nice and hence utility-maximizing.)  But if player A is forced to cooperate, then player 
A is not being kind and player B feels no need to behave kindly. So players B should defect in 
the "involuntary" PD.  
 Other approaches posit a social utility function which combines one’s own payoff with 
their relative share of earnings, or the difference between their payoffs and the payoffs of others.  
One example is Fehr and Schmidt (1999, and this book), who use the function ui(x1, x2,…xn)= xi- 
a Sk[xk-xi]0/(n-1)-bS k[xi-xk]0/(n-1), where [x]0 is x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient a is 
the weight on envy or disadvantageous inequality (when xk > xi ) and b is the weight on guilt or 
advantageous inequality (xi>xk). This inequality-aversion approach matches ultimatum rejections 
because an offer of $2 from a $10 pie, say, has utility 2-(8-2)a while rejecting yields 0. Players 
who are sufficiently envious (a>1/3) will reject such offers.  Inequality-aversion also mimics the 
effect of positive reciprocity because players with positive values of bwill feel heepish about 
earning more money than others do; so they will repay trust and feel bad about defecting in PDs 
and free-riding in public goods contribution games.  Bolton and Oeckenfels (2000) propose a 
similar model. 
 Charness and Rabin (forthcoming) propose a “Rawlsitarian” model which integrates three 
factors—one’s own payoff, and a weighted average of the lowest payoff anyone gets (a la Rawls) 
and the sum of everyone’s payoff (utilitarian).  This utility function explains new results from 
                                                
20He used the theory of psychological games, in which a player’s utilities for outcomes can depend on their beliefs 
(Geanakopolos, Pearce & Stacchetti, 1989).  (For example, a person may take pleasure in being surprised by 
receiving a gift, aside from the gift’s direct utility.) 
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three-person games which are not explained by the inequality-aversion forms, and from a large 
sample of two-person games where the inequality- version approaches often predict poorly.
 The key point is that careful experimental study of simple games in which social 
preferences play a role (like ultimatum and trust) has yielded tremendous regularity. The 
regularity has, in turn, inspired different theories that map payoffs to all players into each player’s 
utility, in a parsimonious way.  Several recent papers compare the predictions of different  
models (see Camerer, 2002, chapter 2). The results show that some form of the intenti nality 
incorporated in Rabin (1993, and this volume) (players care about whether another player meant 
to harm them or help them), combined with inequality aversion or Rawlsitarian mixing will 
explain a lot of data.  Models like these also make new predictions and should be useful in 
microeconomics applications as well. 
 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986 and this volume) studied consumer perceptions of 
fairness using phone surveys.  They asked people about how fair they considered different types 
of firm behavior to be.  In a typical question, they asked people whether a hardware store that 
raised the price of a snow shovel after a snowstorm was behaving fairly or not. ( People thought 
the store was unfair.)  Their results can be neatly summarized by a "dual-entitlement" hypothesis:  
Previous transactions establish a reference level of consumer surplus and producer profit.  Both 
sides are "entitled" to these levels of profit, so price changes which threaten the entitlement are 
considered unfair. 
 Raising snow-shovel prices after a snowstorm, for example, reduces consumer surplus 
and is considered unfair.  But when the cost of a firm’s inputs rises, subjects said it was fair to 
raise prices-- because not raising prices would reduce the firm’s profit (compared to the reference 
profit).  The Kahneman et al framework has found surprisingly little application, despite the 
everyday observation that firms do not change prices and wages as frequently as standard theory 
suggests. For example, when the fourth Harry Potter book was released in summer 2000, most 
stores were allocated a small number of books that were pre-sold in advance. Why not raise 
prices, or auction the books off? Everyday folks, like the subjects in KKT surveys, find actions 
which exploit excess demand to be outrageous.  Concerned about customer goodwill, firms limit 
such price increases.  
 An open question is whether consumers are really willing to express outrage at unfairness 
by boycotts and other real sacrifices.  Even if most aren’t, a little threat of boycott may go a long 
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way toward disciplining firms. (In the ultimatum game, for example, many subjects do accept 
low offers; but the fraction that reject such offers is high enough that it pays for Proposers to 
offer almost half.)  Furthermore, even if consumer boycotts rarely work, offended consumers are 
often able to affect firm behavior by galvanizing media attention or provoking legislation. For 
example,"scalping" tickets for popular sports and entertainment events (reselling them at a large 
premium over the printed ticket price)  is constrained by law in most states.  Some states have 
"anti-gouging" laws penalizing sellers who take advantage of shortages of water, fuel, and other 
necessities by raising prices after natural disasters. A few years ago, responding to public anger at 
rising CEO salaries when the economy was being restructured through downsizing and many 
workers lost their jobs, Congress passed a law prohibiting firms from deducting CEO salary, for 
tax purposes, beyond $1 million a year (Rose & Wolfram, 2000).  Explaining where these laws 
and regulations come from is one example of how behavioral economics might be used to 
expand the scope of law and economics (see Sunstein, 2000).   
  
Behavioral game theory 
Game theory has rapidly become an important foundation for many areas of economic 
theory, such as bargaining in decentralized markets, contracting and organizational structure, as 
well as political economy (e.g., candidates choosing platforms and congressional behavior).  The 
descriptive accuracy of game theory in these applications can be questioned because equilibrium 
predictions often assume sophisticated strategic reasoning, and direct field tests are difficult.  As 
a result, there have been many experiments testing game-theoretic predictions. "Behavioral game 
theory" uses this experimental evidence and psychological intuition to generalize the standard 
assumptions of game theory in a parsimonious way. Some of the experimental evidence, and its 
relation to standard ideas in gme theory, is reviewed by Crawford (1997, and this volume). 
Newer data and theories which explain them are reviewed briefly by Goeree and Holt (1999) and 
at length by Camerer (this volume). 
One component of behavioral game theory is a theory of social preferences for allocations 
of money to oneself and others (discussed above).  Another component is a theory of how people 
choose in one-shot games or in the first period of a repeated game. A simple example is the `p-
beauty contest game":  Players choose numbers i  [0,100] and the player whose number is closest 
in absolute value to p times the average wins a fixed prize. (The game is named after a well-
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known passage in which Keynes compared the stock market to a `beauty contest’ in which 
investors only care about what stocks others think are `beautiful’.) There are many experimental 
studies for p=2/3.  In this game the unique Nash equilibrium is zero.  Since players want to 
choose 2/3 of the average number, if players think others will choose 50, for example, they will 
choose 33. But if they think others use the same reasoning and hence choose 33, they will want to 
choose 22.  Nash equilibrium requires this process to continue until players beliefs’ and choices 
match. The process only stops, mathematically, when x=(2/3)x, yielding an equilibrium of zero.  
In fact, subjects in p-beauty contest experiments seem to use only one or two steps of 
iterated reasoning: Most subjects best-respond to the belief that others choose randomly (step 1), 
choosing 33, or best-r pond to step-1 choices (step-2), choosing 22.  (This result has been 
replicated with many subject pools, including Caltech undergraduates with median math SAT 
scores of 800 and corporate CEOs.)   
Experiments like these show that the mutual consistency assumed in N h equilibrium— 
players correctly anticipate what others will do— is mplausible the first time players face a 
game, so there is room for a theory which is descriptively more accurate.  A plausible theory of 
this behavior is that players use a distribution of decision rules, like the steps which lead to 33 
and 22, or other decision rules (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Cr wford & Broseta, 
2001). Camerer, Ho and Chong (2001) propose a one-parameter cognitive hierarchy (CH) model 
in which the frequency of players using higher and higher steps of thinking is given by a one-
parameter Poisson distribution).  If the mean number of thinking steps is specified in advance 
(1.5 is a reasonable estimated), this theory has zero free parameters, is just as pr cise a Nash 
equilibrium (sometimes more precise), and always fits experimental data better (or equally well).  
. A less behavioral alternative which maintains the Nash assumption of mutual 
consistency of beliefs and choices is a stochastic or "quantal-response" equilibrium (QRE; see 
Goeree and Holt (1999); McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998); cf. Weiszacker, 2000).  In a QRE 
players form beliefs about what others will do, and calculate the expected payoffs of different 
strategies, but they do not always choose the best response with the highest expected payoff (as 
in Nash equilibrium). Instead, strategies are chosen according to a statistical rule in which better 
responses are chosen more often. QRE is appealing because it is a minimal (one-p rameter) 
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generalization of Nash equilibrium, which avoids many of the technical difficulties of Nash21 and 
fits data better.  
A third component of behavioral game theory is a model of learning. Game theory is one 
area of economics in which serious attention has been paid to th  process by which an 
equilibrium comes about. A popular approach is to study the evolution of a population 
(abstracting from details of how different agents in the population learn). Other studies posit 
learning by individual agents, based on their own experience or on imitation (e.g., Schlag, 1998). 
Many learning theories have been proposed and carefully tested with experimental data. Theories 
about population evolution never predict as well as theories of individual learning (though they 
are useful for other purposes).  In reinforcement theories, only chosen strategies get reinforced by 
their outcomes (e.g., Roth et. al., 2000). In belief learning theories, players change their guesses 
about what other players will do, based on what they have seen, and choos  strategies which have 
high expected payoffs given those updated guesses (e.g., Fudenberg & Levine, 1998).  In the 
hybrid EWA theory of Camerer and Ho (1999), players respond weakly to ``foregone payoffs” 
from unchosen strategies and more strongly to payoffs they actually receive (as if underweighting 
``opportunity costs”; see Thaler, 1999 and this volume). Reinforcement and ``fictitious play” 
theories of belief learning are boundary cases of the EWA theory. In many games (e.g., those 
with mixed-strategy equilibria) these theories are about equally accurate, and better than 
equilibrium theories. However, EWA is more robust in the sense that it predicts accurately in 
games where belief and reinforcement theories don’t predict well (see Camerer, Ho and hong, 
2002).   
Some next steps are to explore theoretical implications of the theories that fit data well, 
understand learning in very complex environments. The most important direction is application 
to field settings. Two interesting examples are the industrial structure in the Marseilles fish 
market (Weisbuch, Kirman & Herreiner, 2000), and a massive sample (130,000) of consumer 
supermarket purchases (Ho & Chong, 2000).  
 
                                                
21A classic problem is how players in a dynamic game update their beliefs off the equilibrium path, when a move 
which (in equilibrium) has zero probability occurs. (Bayes’ rule cannot be used because P(event)=0, so any 
conditional probability P(state|event) divides by zero.) QRE sidesteps this problem because stochastic responses 
ensure that all events have positive probability.  This solution is much like the "trembles" proposed by Selten, and 
subsequent refinements, except that the tremble probabiliti s are endogeneous. 
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APPLICATIONS  
 
Macroeconomics and Saving 
Many concepts in macroeconomics probably have a behavioral underpinning that could 
be elucidated by research in psychology.  For example, it is common to assume that prices and 
wages are rigid (in nominal terms), which has important implications for macroeconomic 
behavior.  Rigidities are attibu ed to a vague exogeneous force like “menu costs," shorthand for 
some unspecified process that creates rigidity. Behavioral economics suggests some ideas for 
where rigidity comes from. Loss-aver ion among consumers and workers, perhaps inflamed by 
workers’ concern for fairness, can cause nominal rigidity but are rarely discussed in the modern 
literature (though see Bewley, 1998; Blinder et al, 1998).  
An important model in macroeconomics is the life-cycl model of savings (or permanent 
income hypothesis).  This theory assumes that people make a guess about their lifetime earnings 
profile, and plan their savings and consumption to smooth consumption across their lives.  The 
theory is normatively appealing if consumption in each period has diminishing marginal utility, 
and preferences for consumptions streams are time-separable (i.e., overall utility is the sum of the 
discounted utility of consumption in each separate period).  The theory also assumes people lump 
together different types of income when they guess how much money they’ll have (i.e., different 
sources of wealth are fungible).  
Shefrin and Thaler (1992 and this volume) present a "behavioral life cycle" theory of 
savings in which different sources of income are kept track of in different mental accounts.  
Mental accounts can reflect natural perceptual or cognitive divisions. For example, it is possible 
to add up your paycheck and the dollar value of your frequent flyer miles, but it is simply 
unnatural (and a little arbitrary) to do so, like measur ng th  capacity of your refrigerator by how 
many calories it holds. Mental accounts can also be bright-line devices to avoid temptation: 
Allow yourself to head to Vegas after cashing an IRS refund check, but not after raiding the 
childrens’ college fund or taking out a housing equity loan.  Shefrin and Thaler (1992, and this 
volume) show that plausible assumptions about mental accounting for wealth predict important 
deviations from life-cycle savings theory.  For example, the measured marginal propensities to 
consume (MPC) an extra dollar of income from different income categories are very different. 
The MPC from housing equity is extremely low (people don’t see their house as a pile of cash).  
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On the other hand, the MPC from windfall gains is substantial and often close to 1 (the MPC 
from one-time tax cuts is around 1/3-2/3).  
 It is important to note that many key implications of the life-cycle hypothesis have never 
been well-supported empirically (e.g., consumption is far more closely related to current income 
than it should be according to theory). Admittedly, since empirical tests of the life-cycle model 
involve many auxiliary assumptions, there are many possible culprits if the theory’s predictions 
are not corroborated. Predictions can be improved by introducing utility functions with “habit 
formation,” in which utility in a current period depends on the reference point of previous 
consumption, and by more carefully accounting for uncertainty about future income (see e.g. 
Carroll, 2000).  Mental accounting is only one of several behavioral approaches that may prove 
useful.  
An important concept in Keynesian economics is “money illusion”— the tendency to 
make decisions based on nominal quantities rather than converting those figures into “real” terms 
by adjusting for inflation. Money illusion seems to be pervasive in some domains.  In one study 
(Baker, Gibbs, & Holmstrom, 1994) of wage changes in a large financial firm, only 200 of more 
than 60,000 wage changes were nominal decreases, but 15% of employees suffered real wage 
cuts over a 10-year period, and in many years more than half of wage increases were real 
declines. It appears that employees don’t seem to mind if their real wage falls as long as their 
nominal wage does not fall.  Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997 and this volume) demonstrate 
the pervasiveness of money illusion experimentally and sketch ways to model it.  
 
Labor economics 
 A central puzzle in macroeconomics is involuntary unemployment-- why can some 
people not find work (beyond frictions of switching jobs, or a natural rate of unemployment)?  A 
popular account of unemployment posits that wages are deliberately paid above the market-
clearing level, which creates an excess supply of workers and hence, unemployment. But why are 
wages too high?  One interpretation, "efficiency wage theory," is that paying workers more than 
they deserve is necessary to ensure that they have something to lose if they are fired, which 
motivates them to work hard and economizes on monitoring. Akerlof and Yellen (1990 and this 
volume) have a different interpretation:  Human instincts to reciprocate transform the employer-
worker relation into a "gift-exchange".  Employers pay more than they have to as a gift; and 
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workers repay the gift by working harder than necessary. They show how gift-exchange can be an 
equilibrium (given reciprocal preferences), and show some of its macroeconomic implications.  
In labor economics, gift-exchange is clearly evident in the elegant series of experimental 
labor markets described by Fehr and Gachter (2000, and this volume). In their experiments there 
is an excess supply of workers. Firms offer wages; workers who take the jobs then choose a level 
of effort, which is costly to the workers and valuable to the firms. To make the experiments 
interesting, firms and workers can enforce wages, but not effort levels.  Since workers and firms 
are matched anonymously for just one period, and do not learn each other’s identities, there is no 
way for either side to build reputations or for firms to punish w rkers who chose low effort.  
Self-interested workers should shirk, and firms should anticipate that and pay a low wage. In fact, 
firms deliberately pay high wages as gifts, and workers choose higher effort levels when they 
take higher-wage jobs.  The strong correlation between wages and effort is stable over time.  
 Other chapters in this section explore different types of departures from the standard 
assumptions that are made about labor supply.  For example, standard life-cycle theory assumes 
that, if people can borrow, they should prefer wage profiles which maximize the present value of 
lifetime wages. Holding total wage payments constant, and assuming a positive real rate of 
interest, present value maximization implies that workers should prefer declining wage profiles 
over increasing ones.  In fact, most wage profiles are clearly rising over time, a phenomenon 
which Frank and Hutchens (1993, and this volume) show cannot be explained by changes in 
marginal productivity.  Rather, workers derive utility from positive changes in consumption, but 
have self-control problems that would prevent them from saving for later consumption if wages 
were front-loaded in the life-cycle.  In addition, workers seem to derive positive utility from 
increasing wage profiles, per se, perhaps because rising wages are a source of self-esteem; th  
desire for increasing payments is much weaker for non-wage income (see Loewenstein & 
Sicherman, 1991).   
 The standard life-cycle account of labor supply also implies that workers should 
intertemporally substitute labor and leisure based on the wage rate they face and the value they 
place on leisure at different points in time.  If wage fluctuations are temporary, workers should 
work long hours when wages are high and short hours when wages are low. However, because 
changes in wages are often persisting, and because work hours are generally fixed in the short-
run, it is in practice typically difficult to tell whether workers are substituting intertemporally 
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(though see Mulligan, 1998).  Camerer et al. (1997, and this volume) studied labor supply of cab 
drivers in New York City (NYC).  Cab drives represent a useful source of data for examining 
intertemporal substitution because drivers rent their cabs for a half-day and their work hours are 
flexible (they can quit early, and often do), and wages fluctuate daily because of changes in 
weather, day-of-the-week effects, and so forth.  Their study was inspired by an alternative to the 
substitution hypothesis:  Many drivers say they set a daily income target, and quit when they 
reach that target (in behavioral economics language, they isolate their daily decision and are 
averse to losing relative to an income target).  Drivers who target daily will drive longer hours on 
low-wage days, and quit early on high-wage days. This behavior is exactly the opposite of 
intertemporal substitution.  Camerer et al (1997, and this volume) found that data from three 
samples of inexperienced drivers support the daily targeting prediction. But experienced drive s 
do not have negative elasiticies, e ther because target-minded drivers earn less and self-select out 
of the sample of experienced drives, or drivers learn over time to substi ute rather than target.  
 Perhaps the simplest prediction of labor economics is that the supply of labor should be 
upward sloping in response to a transitory increase in wage.  Gneezy and Rustichini (this 
volume) document one situation in which this is not the case.  They hired students to perform a 
boring task and either paid them a low piece-rate, a moderately high piece-rate, or no piece-rate 
at all.  The surprising finding was that individuals in the low piece-rate condition produces the 
lowest "output" levels.  Paying subjects, they argued, caused subjects to think of themselves as 
working in exchange for money and, when the amount of money was small, they decided that it 
simply wasn't worth it.  In another study reported in their chapter, they showed a similar effect in 
a natural experiment that focused on a domain other than labor supply.  To discourage parents 
from picking their children up late, a day-care center instituted a fine for each minute that parents 
arrived late at the center.  The fine had the perverse effect of increasingparental lateness.  The 
authors postulated that the fine eliminated the moral disapprobation associated with arriving late 
(robbing it of its gift- iving quality) and replaced it with a simple monetary cost which some 
parents decided was worth incurring.  Their results show that the effect of  price changes can be 
quite different than in economic theory when behavior has moral components which wages and 
prices alter.  
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Finance 
In finance, standard equilibrium models of asset pricing assume that investors only care 
about asset risks if they affect marginal utility of consumption, and they incorporate publicly 
available information to forecast stock returns as accurately as possible (the "efficient markets 
hypothesis").  While these hypotheses do make some accurate predictions—e.g., the 
autocorrelation of price changes is close to zero—ther  are numerous anomalies. The anomalies 
have inspired the development of  "behavioral finance" theories exploring the hypothesis that 
some investors in assets have limited rationality.  Important articles are collected in Thaler 
(1993) and reviewed in Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2001).   
An important anomaly in finance is the "equity premium puzzle":  Average returns to 
stocks are much higher than returns to bonds (presumably to compensate stockhold rs for higher 
perceived risks).22  To account for this pattern, Benartzi and Thaler (1995 and this volume) 
assume a combination of decision isolation—investors evaluate returns using a 1-year horizon—
and aversion to losses.  These two ingredients create much more perceived risk to holding stocks 
than would be predicted by expected utility.  Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) use a similar 
intuition in a standard asset pricing equation. Several recent papers (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1998) show how empirical patterns of short-term underreaction to earnings surprises, 
and long-term overreaction, can arise from a quasi-B yesian model.   
Another anomaly is the magnitude of volume in the market.  The so-called "Groucho 
Marx" theorem states that people should not want to trade with people who would want to trade 
with them, but the volume of stock market transactions is staggering.  For example, Odean (1999 
and this volume) notes that the annual turnover rate of shares on the New York Stock Exchange 
is greater than 75 percent, and the daily trading volume of foreign-exchange transactions in all 
currencies (including forwards, swaps, and spot transactions) is equal to about one-quarter of the 
total annual world trade and investment flow.  Odean (1999, and this volume) then presents data 
on individual trading behavior which suggests that the extremely high volume may be driven, in 
part, by overconfidence on the part of investors.
                                                
22The idea of loss aversion has appeared in other guises without being directly linked to its presence in individual 
choice.  For example, Fama (1991:1596) wrote that "consumers live in morbid fear of recessions."  His conjecture 
can only be reasonably construed as a disproportionate aversion to a drop in standard of living, or overweighting the 
low probability of economic catastrophe. Both are features of prospect theory.  
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 The rise of behavioral finance is particularly striking because, until recently fi ancial 
theory bet all its chips on the belief that investors are too rational to ignore observed historical 
patterns-- the "efficient markets hypothesis."  Early heretics like Shiller (1981), who argued 
empirically that stock price swings are too volatile to reflect only news, and DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985), who discovered an important overreaction effect based on the psychology of 
representativeness, had their statistical work "audited" with special scrutiny (or worse, were 
simply ignored).  In 1978 Jensen called the efficient markets hypothesis "the most well-
established regularity in social science."  Shortly after Jensen’s grand pronouncement, however, 
the list of anomalies began to grow.  (To be fair, anomaly-hunting is aided by the fact that marke
efficiency is such a precise, easily-testable claim).  A younger generation are now eagerly 
sponging up as much psychology as they can to help explain anomalies in a unified way.  
  
NEW FOUNDATIONS 
In a final, brief section of the book, we include two pap rs hat take behavioral economics 
in new directions.  The first is case-based decision theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995 and this 
volume). Because of the powerful influence of decision theory (a la Ramsey, de Finetti, & 
Savage) economists are used to thinking of risky choices as inevitably reflecting a probability-
weighted average of the utility of their possible consequences.  The case-based approach starts 
from different primitives.  It treats a choice situation as a "case" which has degrees of similarity 
to previous cases. Actions in the current case are evaluated by a sum or average of the outcomes 
of the same action in previous cases, weighted by the similarity of those previous cases to the 
current one.  Cased-based theory substitutes the psyc olog  of probability of future outcomes for 
a psychology of similarity with past cases.  
The primitive process of case comparison is widely used in cognitive science and is 
probably a better representation of how choices are made in many domains than is probability-
weighted utility evaluation.  In hiring new faculty members or choosing graduate students, you 
probably don’t talk in terms of utilities and probabilities.  Instead, it is irresistible to compare a 
candidate to others who are similar and who did well r poorly.  Case-based reasoning may be 
just as appealing in momentous decisions,  like choosing a presidential ticket (Lloyd Bentsen’s "I 
knew John Kennedy, and you’re no John Kennedy") or managing international conflict ("Will 
fighting the drug war in Colombia lead to another Vietnam?").  Explicitly case-based approaches 
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are also widely used in the economy. Agents base a list price for a house on the selling prices of 
nearby houses that are similar ("comparables").  "Nearest-neighbo " techniques based on 
similarity are also used in credit-scoring and other kinds of evaluations. 
Another promising new direction is the study of emotion, which has boomed in recent 
years (see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2001, for a review of this literature with a special focus on its 
implications for decision making).  Damasio (1994) found that people with relatively minor 
emotional impairments have trouble making decisions and, when they do, they often make 
disastrous ones.  Other research shows that what appears to be delibera ive decision making may 
actually be driven by gut-level emotions or drives, then rationalized as a thoughtful decision 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).  Loewenstein (1996, in this volume, and 2000) discusses the 
possibilities and challenges from incorporating emotions into economic models.
There are many other new directions that behavioral economics is taking that, we hope, will 
provide more than adequate content for a sequel to this volume in the not too distant future.  One 
such thrust is the study of  "hedonics" (e.g., Kahneman, Diener, & Schwartz, 1999; Kahneman, 
Sarin & Wakker, 1997).  Hedonics begins by expanding the notion of utility.  In the neoclassical 
view, utility is simply a number that codifies an expressed preference ("decision utility").  But 
people may also have memories of which goods or activities they enjoyed most ("remembered 
utility"), immediate momentary sensations of pleasure and pain ("instant utility"), and guesses 
about what future utilities will be like ("forecasted utility").  It would be remarkable coincidence 
if the human brain were built to guarantee that all four types of utility were exactly the same.  For 
example, current utilities and decision processes both depend on emotional or visceral states (like 
hunger, fatigue, anger, sympathy, or arousal), and people overestimate the extent they will be in 
the same hedonic state in the future (Loewenstein, 1996, and this volume). As a result,  
forecasted utility is biased in the direction of instant utility (see Loewenstein, O’Donoghue & 
Rabin, 1998).  The differences among these utilities is important because a deviation between 
decision utility and one of the other types of utility means there is a mismatch which could 
perhaps be corrected by policies, education, or social guidance.  For example, addicts may 
relapse because their remembered utility from using drugs highlights pleasure and excludes the 
instant disutility of withdrawal.  The new hedonics links survey ratings of happiness with 
economic measures.  For example, Easterlin (1974) stressed that average expressed ratings of 
happiness rise over decades much less than income rose.  He suggested that people derive much 
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of their happiness from relative income (which, by definition, cannot rise over time).  Studies of 
worker quit rates, suicide, and other behavioral measures show similar effects of relative income 
and tie the happiness research to important economic phenomena (Clark & Oswald, 1994, 1996; 
Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Oswald, 1997).   
A second direction uses neuroscientifi  vidence to guide assumptions about economic 
behavior.  Neuroscience is exploding with discoveries because of advances in imaging 
techniques which permit more precise temporal and spatial location of brain activity.23 It is 
undoubtedly a large leap from precise neural activity to big decisions like planning for retirement 
or buying a car. Nonetheless, neuroscientific data may show that cognitive activities that are 
thought to be equivalent in economic theory actually differ, or activities thought to be different 
may be the same. These data could resolve years or decades of debate which are difficult to 
resolve with other sorts of experiments (see Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec, in press)  
A third direction acknowledges Herb Simon’s emphasis on "procedural rationality" and 
model the procedures or algorithms people use (e.g., Rubinstein, 1998).  This effort is likely to 
yield models which are not simply generalizations of standard ones. For example, Rubinstein 
(1988) models risky choice as a process of comparing the similarity of the probabilities and 
outcomes in two gambles, and choosing on dimensions which are dissimilar.  This procedure has 
some intuitive appeal but it violates all the standard axioms and is not easily expressed by 
generalizations of those axioms.   
 
Concluding Comments 
As we mentioned above, behavioral economics simply rekindles an interest in psychology 
that was put aside when economics was formalized in the latter part of the neoclassical 
revolution. In fact, we believe that many familiar economic distinctions do have a lot of 
behavioral content—they are implicitly behavioral, and could surely benefit from more explicit 
ties to psychological ideas and data.  
                                                
23A substantial debate is ongoing in cognitive psychology about whether knowing the precise details of how the brain 
carries out computations is necessary to understand functions and mechanisms at higher levels.  (Knowing the 
mechanical details of how a car works may not be necessary to turn the key and driveit.) Most psychology 
experiments use indirect measures like response times, error rates, self-reports, and "natural experiments" due to 
brain lesions, and have been fairly successful in codifying what we know about thinking; pessimists think brain scan 
studies won’t add much.  The optimists think the new tools will inevitably lead to some discoveries and the upside 
potential is so great that they cannot be ignored.  We share the latter view. 
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 An example is the distinction between short-run and long-run price elasticity. Every 
textbook mentions this distinction, with a casual suggestion that the long run is the time it takes 
for markets to adjust, or for consumers to learn new prices, after a demand or supply shock.  
Adjustment costs undoubtedly have technical and social components, but probably also have 
some behavioral underpinning in the form of gradual adaptation to loss, and learning.   
Another macroeconomic model which can be interpreted as implicitly behavioral is the 
Lucas "islands" model (1975).  Lucas shows that business cycles can emerge if agents observe 
local price changes (on "their own island") but not general price inflation. Are the "islands" 
simply a metaphor for the limits of their own minds?  If so, theory of cognition could add helpful 
detail.  
 Theories of organizational contracting are shot through with implicitly behavioral 
economics.  Williamson (1985) and others motivate the incompleteness of contracts as a 
consequence of bounded rationality in foreseeing the future, but do not tie the research directly to
work on imagery, memory, and imagination. Agency theory begins with the presumption that 
there is some activity the agent does not like to do -- usually called "effort" -- which cannot be 
easily monitored or enforced, and which the principal wants the agent to do.  The term "effort" 
connotes lifting sides of beef or biting your tongue when restaurant customers are sassy. What 
exactly is the "effort" agents dislike exerting, which principals want them to?  It’s not likely to be 
time on the job-- if anything, workaholic CEOs may be working too hard! A more plausible 
explanation, rooted in loss-aversion, fairness, self-serving bias, and emotion, is that managers 
dislike making hard, painful decisions (such as large layoffs, or sacking senior managers who are 
close friends).  Jensen (1993) hints at the idea that overcoming these behavioral obstacles is what 
takes "effort"; Holmstrom and Kaplan (2000) talk about why markets are better at making 
dramatic changes than managers but ascribe much of the resistance o ``influence costs".  
Influence costs are the costs managers incur lobbying for projects they like or personally benefit 
from (like promotions or raises).  A lot of influence costs are undoubtedly inflated by optimistic 
biases-- each division manager really does think their division desperately needs funds--, self-
serving biases, and social comparison of pay and benefits (otherwise, why are salaries kept so 
secret?).   
In all these cases, conventional economic language has emerged which begs the deeper 
psychological questions of where adjustment costs, rigidities, mental "islands", contractual 
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incompleteness, effort-aversion, and influence costs come from.  Cognitively detailed models of 
these phenomena could surely produce surprising testable predictions.  
 
Is psychology regularity an assumption or a conclusion?  
Behavioral economics as described in this chapter, and compiled in this book, generally 
begins with assumptions rooted in psychological regularity and asks what follows from those 
assumptions.  An alternative approach is to work backward, regarding a psychological regularity 
as a conclusion that must be proved, an explanandum that must be derived from deeper 
assumptions before we fully understand and accept it.   
The alternative approach is exemplifi d by a fashionable new direction in economic 
theory (and psychology too), which is to explain human behavior as the product of evolution.  
Theories of this sort typically describe an evolutionary environment, a range of behaviors, and 
precise rules for evolution of behavior (e.g., replicator dynamics), and then show that a particular 
behavior is evolutionarily stable. For example, overconfidence about skill is evolutionarily 
adaptive under some conditions (Postlewaite & Comte, 2001; Waldman, 1994). Loss-aversion 
can be adaptive (because exaggerating one’s preference for an object improves one’s outcome 
under the Nash bargaining solution and perhaps other protocols; e.g., Carmichael & MacLeod, 
1999).  Rejections of low offers in take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum games are often interpreted as 
evidence of a specialized adaptation for punishing partners in repeated interactions, which cannot 
be "turned off" in unnatural one-sh t games with strangers (e.g., Samuelson, 2001).  
We believe in evolution, of course, but we do not believe that behavior of intelligent, 
modern people immersed in socialization and cultural influence can on y be understood by 
guessing what their ancestral lives were like and how their brains might have adapted genetically.  
Furthermore, a major challenge for evolutionary modeling is that ex post "just so stories" are easy 
to concoct because there many degrees of freedom permitted by our inability to travel back in 
time to the ancestral past. As a result, it is easy to figure out mathematically whether an 
evolutionary story is a sufficient explanation of behavior, and almost impossible to know 
whether a particular story is necessarily the right one.  
Another potential problem with evolutionary reasoning is that most studies posit a special 
brain mechanism to solve a particular adaptive problem, but ignore the effect of how that 
mechanism constrains solution of other adaptive problems.  (This is nothing more than the 
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general equilibrium critique of partial equilibrium modelling, applied to the brain.) For example, 
a fashionable interpretation of why responders reject ultimatum offers is that agents cannot 
instinctively distinguish between one-shot and repeated games. But agents who could not do this 
would presumably be handicapped in many other sorts of decisions which require distinguishing 
unique and repeated situations, or accurately forecasting horizons (such as life-cycle planning), 
unless they have a special problem making distinctions among types of games.  
There are other, non-evolutionary, models that treat psychological regularity as a 
conclusion to be proved rather than an assumption to be used.24 Such models usually begin with 
an observed regularity, and reverse-engineer circumstances under which it can be optimal. 
Models of this sort appeal to the sweet tooth economists have for deriving behavior from "first 
principles" and rationalizing apparent irrationality.  Theories of this sort are useful behavioral 
economics, provided they are held to the same high standards all good models are (and earlier 
behavioral models have been held to):  Namely, can they parsimoniously explain a range of data 
with one simple mechanism? And what fres  predictions do they make? 
 
Final thoughts 
 Critics have pointed out that behavioral economics is not a unified theory, but is instead a 
collection of tools or ideas. This is true. It is also true of neoclassical economics.  A worker 
might rely on a "single" tool-- say, a power drill-- but also use a wide range of drill bits to do 
various jobs. Is this one tol or many?  As Arrow (1986) pointed out, economic models do not 
derive much predictive power from the single tool of utility-maximization. Precision comes from 
the drill bits—such as time-additive separable utility in asset pricing including a child's utility 
into a parent’s utility function to explain bequests, rationality of expectations for some 
applications and adaptive expectations for others, homothetic preferences for commodity 
bundles, price-taking in some markets and game-theor tic reasoning in others, and so forth.  
                                                
24For example, one recent model (Benabou & Tirole, 1999) derives overconfidence from hyperbolic time 
discounting.  Agents, at time 0, face a choice at time 1 between a task that requires an immediate exertion of effort 
and a payoff delayed till time 2 which depends on their level of some skill.  Agents know that, due to hyperbolic ime 
discounting, some tasks that are momentarily attractive at time 0 will become unattractive at time 1.  Overconfidence 
arises because they persuade themselves that their skill level  – i.e., the r turn from the task – will be greater than it 
actually will be so as to motivate themselves to do the task at time 1.  There may, however, be far more plausible 
explanations for the same phenomenon, such as that people derive utility directly from self-este m. Indeed the same 
authors later proposed pr cisely such a model (Benabou & Tirole, 2000). 
 
 48
Sometimes these specifications are even contradictory— for example, pure self-interest is 
abandoned in models of bequests, but restored in models of life-cycl  avings; and risk-aversion 
is typically assumed in equity markets and risk-prefe ence in betting markets. Such 
contradictions are like the "contradiction" between a Phillips-he d and a regular screwdriver:  
They are different tools for different jobs. The goal of behavioral economics is to develop better 
tools that, in some cases, can do both jobs at once.  
Economists like to point out the natural division of labor between scientific disciplines: 
Psychologists should stick to individual minds, and economists to behavior in games, markets, 
and economies. But the division of labor is only efficient if there is effective coordination, and all 
too often economists fail to conduct intellectual trade with those who have a comparative 
advantage in understanding individual human behavior.  All economics rests on s e sort of 
implicit psychology.  The only question is whether the implicit psychology in economics is good 
psychology or bad psychology. We think it is simply unwise, and inefficient, to do economics 
without paying some attention to good psychology.   
We should finally stress that behavioral economics is not meant to be a separate approach 
in the long run. It is more like a school of thought or a style of modeling, which should lose 
special semantic status when it is widely taught and used.  Our hope is that behavioral models 
will gradually replace simplified models based on stricter rationality, as the behavioral models 
prove to be tractable and useful in explaining anomalies and making surprising predictions.  
Then strict rationality assumptions now considered indispensable in economics will be seen as 
useful special cases (much as Cobb-Douglas production functions or expected value 
maximization are now)—namely, they help illustrate a point which is truly established only by 
more general, behaviorally-grounded theory.  
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